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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Regulators, under unprecedented pressure, face a range of demands, 
often contradictory in nature: be less intrusive—but more effective; be 
kinder and gentler—but don’t let the bastards get away with any-
thing; focus your efforts—but be consistent; process things quicker—
 
∗ Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.  Professor Minan is the 
Chairman of the Water Board, San Diego Region, and he served on the Water Board that 
adopted various types of storm water permits.  The views expressed in this article are his 
own, and do not represent those of the State of California or any of its agencies. 
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and be more careful next time; deal with important issues—but do not 
stray outside your statutory authority; be more responsive to the regu-
lated community—but do not get captured by industry. 
Malcolm K. Sparrow1 
If regulators are to make a difference in improving and pro-
tecting water quality, they must focus their attention, time, and 
energy on significant problem areas.  This article examines one 
such area: the use of “general permits”2 to regulate storm water 
discharges from construction activities under the Clean Water 
Act (CWA).3 
This article explores the connection between construction ac-
tivities and water quality, and the baseline rules governing storm 
water permitting.  It also analyzes the legal controversy, which 
has split the federal circuits,4 of treating the Notice of Intent 
(NOI) to be covered by the terms of the general permit and ac-
companying Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP) as 
the “functional equivalent” of a permit or permit application.5  
This controversy springs primarily from the fact that the CWA 
does not define the terms “permit” or “permit application.”6  In a 
broad sense, the central inquiry is one of statutory construction:  
What does the CWA require? 
The functional equivalent theory is significant because its 
application to a NOI and accompanying SWPPP triggers the 
statutory entitlement to a public hearing and public availability.7  
 
 1 MALCOLM K. SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING 
PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 17 (2000). 
 2 General permits are an administrative mechanism developed by the EPA to regu-
late an entire group or category of similarly situated activities in the least burdensome 
manner for the permittee and administering agency.  A “general permit may be written to 
regulate one or more categories or subcategories of discharges or sludge use or disposal 
practices or facilities, within the area described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, where 
the sources within a covered subcategory of discharges are . . . [s]torm water point 
sources[.] . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2) (2004). 
 3 Clean Water Act §§ 101–607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000).  The CWA is com-
monly cited to both its original section numbers and the United States Code. 
 4 Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency [hereinafter EPA], 344 
F.3d 832, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (treating the Notice of Intent (NOI), in some regards, as the 
“functional equivalent” of a permit or permit application); Tex. Indep. Producers and Roy-
alty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 978 (7th Cir. 2005), reh’g denied en banc Aug. 
26, 2005, (concluding that the terms “permit application” and “permit” do not include 
NOIs and SWPPPs). 
 5 Clean Water Act § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000) provides that “the Ad-
ministrator [of the EPA] may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit . . . .”  
See also discussion infra Part VII. The “Functional” Permit Theory. 
 6 Clean Water Act §§ 101–607, 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251–1387 (LexisNexis 2002); see 
Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (interpreting congressional 
intent to aid in defining the scope of the term “permit”). 
 7 Clean Water Act § 402(a)(1) sets forth the public hearing requirement: “the Ad-
ministrator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit.”  Clean Water Act § 
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A public hearing and the opportunity for public comment is af-
forded when the “general permit” is promulgated by the U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the Federal Register, 
not typically at the time the individual NOI is submitted to the 
permitting agency by the owner or operator of the construction 
site.8 
An active and involved public is crucial to the success of the 
construction storm water management program.  Public hearings 
are generally recognized as an essential component to sound de-
cision making and to the advancement of democratic ideals.  
However, it may be argued that a public hearing on an individual 
NOI and SWPPP is not required by the CWA.  This argument 
ought not be construed as a general argument against public 
hearings or public participation.  Providing a hearing upon filing 
a NOI may undermine the general permitting scheme by creating 
an undue administrative burden on the agency issuing construc-
tion storm water permits.  Nevertheless, in those jurisdictions 
subscribing to the “functional equivalent” theory, administrative 
solutions must be found to deal with this requirement. 
Any statute, including those that are well drafted and seem-
ingly clear, may lead to a variety of argued-for statutory con-
structions.  This situation is equally true with respect to the 
functional equivalent theory.  Language is inherently a breeding 
ground for ambiguity.  On some occasions, the ambiguity is in-
tentional on the part of Congress, whereas at other times it is 
not. Oftentimes the varying interpretations or constructions be-
come apparent only after viewed through the lens of creativity. 
The proper statutory construction of the meaning of “permit” 
or “permit application” lies at the heart of the constructional is-
sue that has divided the federal courts.9  Like most questions of 
statutory construction, Congress has within its power the ability 
to settle the controversy by clarifying its intent.  Alternatively, 
the Supreme Court of the United States may be asked to resolve 
the controversy, which is likely given the division between the 
federal circuits on the functional equivalent theory.  The need for 
uniformity in administering the CWA, the economic impact of the 
 
402(j) states: “A copy of each permit application and each permit issued under this section 
shall be available to the public.  Such permit application or permit, or portion thereof, 
shall further be available on request for the purpose of reproduction.” 
 8 See ABA SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, AND RES., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
HANDBOOK 44–47 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 2d ed. 2003). 
 9 Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 853, 858 (9th Cir. 2003) (treating the 
Notice of Intent (NOI) as “functionally equivalent” to a permit or permit application, and 
thus requiring it to be “available to the public” and “subject to public hearings.”); Tex. In-
dep. Producers and Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 978–79 n.13 (7th Cir. 
2005), reh’g denied en banc Aug. 26, 2005, (rejecting the functional equivalent theory). 
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theory on the regulated community, and the importance of public 
participation to the community also provide strong impetus to 
the need of settling the controversy. 
The general goal of regulation is to abate and control the 
risks to society.  The CWA, which is the principal regulatory 
statute designed to protect society and the integrity of our na-
tion’s waters, provides the legal structure for regulating storm 
water runoff.10  Regulating discharges to waters of the United 
States from construction activities is an important chapter in the 
story of storm water management.  But it is only part of the lar-
ger story of regulating storm water runoff from other industrial 
and municipal activities. 
The federal National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem (NPDES)11 of the CWA authorizes12 the use of “general” 
permits for construction activities that discharge storm water13 
either directly to waters of the United States or indirectly 
through a municipal “separate” storm sewer system (MS4).14  The 
principal tool or condition contained in the NPDES general storm 
water permit used to manage such discharges is the SWPPP.15  
The SWPPP identifies the potential sources of pollution that are 
expected from the construction site, describes the best manage-
ment practices (BMPs)16 to be used by the developer to reduce the 
 
 10 Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000) declares Congress’s objective 
to be “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Na-
tion’s waters.”  The other important federal statute dealing with water quality is the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-9 (West 2003).  It directs the EPA to set 
primary and secondary maximum levels for contaminants in public drinking water sys-
tems. 
In 1987, the CWA was amended to add specific provisions dealing with the regula-
tion of storm water, which are contained in Section 402(p).  Clean Water Act § 402(p), 33 
U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2000). 
 11 Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000). 
 12 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2)(i) (2004); see also Clean Water Act § 402(p)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 
1342(p)(6) (2000). 
 13 Storm water is defined in the EPA regulations to include “storm water runoff, 
snow melt runoff, and surface runoff and drainage.”  40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(13); see also 40 
C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (dealing with discharges associated with industrial activities). 
 14 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8) (2004) (defining the term “separate” as a conveyance sys-
tem that discharges directly to the receiving water without any pretreatment).  In con-
trast, a combined sewer system conveys sanitary wastewater and storm water through a 
single set of pipes to a publicly owned treatment works (POTW) for treatment prior to dis-
charge to a receiving water.  Id. 
 15 The required content of the SWPPP is described in NPDES General Permit for 
Storm Water Discharges from Construction Activities, at ¶ 3.4 (2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/cgp2003_entirepermit.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2006) 
[hereinafter NPDES General Permit]. 
 16 A BMP is a technique, process, activity, or structure used to reduce pollutants.  It 
may be nonstructural, such as good housekeeping or simply preventive maintenance, or 
structural, such as bio-retention swales to promote infiltration.  Storm Water Manage-
ment for Industrial Activities: Developing Pollution Prevention Plans and Best Manage-
ment Practices (EPA) Oct. 1992, at 8. 
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pollutants, and affirms that the developer will comply with the 
terms and conditions of the storm water permit.17 
In regulating the pollutants in storm water discharges from 
construction sites, general permits, which regulate an entire 
group or category of similarly situated activities, are the norm 
throughout the United States.18  The reason is straightforward: 
administrative necessity.  The number of construction sites sub-
ject to the storm water provisions of the CWA is simply too large 
to be regulated by individually tailored NPDES construction 
storm water permits.  This reality elevates the practical impor-
tance of general permits relative to individually issued permits. 
The General Permit for Storm Water Discharges from Con-
struction Activities (CGP) is promulgated by the EPA.19  The 
CGP has gone through a series of updates and changes since the 
storm water provisions contained in Section 402(p) of the CWA 
were added to the law in 1987.20  The first general storm water 
permit for construction activities was issued by the EPA in 
1992.21  This was followed by the 1998 CGP.22  The 2003 CGP,23 
which supersedes the earlier permits and applies both to large 
and to small construction sites, became effective on July 1, 
2003.24  The CGP does not deal with or authorize post-
construction discharges of storm water as these discharges are 
separately regulated.25  As discussed later in this article, states 
may also administer the federal storm water discharge program 
under an EPA-approved program.26 
Prior to the commencement of construction, the owner of the 
building site submits a NOI to be covered by the CGP27 to the 
 
 17 NPDES General Permit, supra note 15, at ¶ 3.1. 
 18 The use of general permits was first suggested to the EPA in response to its at-
tempt to exempt large categories of storm water discharges from NPDES permit require-
ments.  See, e.g., Nat’l Res. Def. Counsel v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393, 1395, 1401–02 (D.C. 
1975), aff’d, Nat’l Res. Def. Counsel v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 19 See NPDES General Permit, supra note 15. 
 20 Clean Water Act § 402(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2000). 
 21 57 Fed. Reg. 41,176 (Sept. 9, 1992).  Public comment on the permit was requested 
in 56 Fed. Reg. 40,948 (Aug. 16, 1991). 
 22 63 Fed. Reg. 7858 (Feb. 17, 1998) (“The Regional Administrators of Regions 1, 2, 3, 
7, 8, 9 and 10 are today issuing final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) general permits for stormwater discharges associated with construction activ-
ity.”); 63 Fed. Reg. 36,490 (July 6, 1998) (“Region 6 is issuing the final [NPDES] general 
permits for stormwater discharges associated with construction activity in Region 6.”). 
 23 NPDES General Permit, supra note 15, at ¶ 1.2. 
 24 68 Fed. Reg. 39,087 (July 1, 2003). 
 25 NPDES General Permit, supra note 15, at ¶ 1.3.C. 
 26 Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000).  See also discussion infra 
Part V. The Role of the States in Storm Water Regulation. 
 27 68 Fed. Reg. 39,087, 39,089 (July 1, 2003).  The EPA’s Construction General Per-
mit also uses the term “operator” to describe the party responsible for complying with its 
terms.  An operator is any party associated with a construction project that meets either 
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EPA or state-approved agency administering the storm water 
law with the certification, made under the penalty of law,28 that 
the CGP will be implemented.29  Permitting authorities vary in 
their treatment of NOIs.  Some authorities automatically grant 
permit coverage upon submittal or receipt of the NOI or after a 
stipulated waiting period.  Other permitting authorities require 
the operator to wait for confirmation that coverage has been 
granted.30  In response to Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. 
EPA,31 the EPA “recommends,” but does not require, that permit-
ting authorities make NOIs available to the public at least thirty 
days before authorization to discharge.32  This recommendation is 
typical of the “waiting period” approach. 
Providing a public hearing for each construction activity 
seems at odds with the system of general permits.  Consequently, 
a retooling of the current administrative practice is necessary to 
accommodate the view that the CWA requires a public hearing.  
Until the law is settled, administrative solutions must be found 
in those federal judicial circuits that require that a public hear-
ing be provided on NOIs and SWPPPs in order to be able to move 
forward with regulating construction activities.  These solutions 
must be found in a timely manner because the construction in-
dustry is both dynamic and one of the country’s largest engines of 
economic growth.  Administrative uncertainty as to the legal 
mandates adds delay and increased cost to construction projects, 
which inevitably must be borne by consumers. 
 
of the following criteria: 1) operational control over the construction plans and specifica-
tions, or 2) day-to-day operational control of those activities that are necessary to comply 
with a SWPPP or other permit conditions.  See NPDES General Permit, supra note 15, at 
Appendix A-2. 
 28 See, e.g., EPA, Notice of Intent (NOI) for Stormwater Discharges Associated with 
Construction Activity Under a NPDES General Permit, Form 3510-9 (Rev.6/03), available 
at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/monitoring/inspections/ 
npdesinspect/npdesinspectappt.pdf. 
 29 See, e.g., NPDES General Permit, supra note 15, at ¶ 2.4. 
 30 EPA National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Storm Water 
Program Questions and Answers, “What does the submittal of an NOI mean?” 4 (January 
21, 2004) (on file with author); see also NPDES General Permit, supra note 15, at ¶ 2.1(B) 
(authorizing the discharge seven calendar days after acknowledgment of the completed 
NOI).  The EPA has proposed a new 30 day waiting period that begins on the day that the 
NOI is posted on its e-NOI web site.  Proposed 2006 Multi-Sector General Permit, ¶ 3.3, 
available at www.epa.gov/npdes/ pubs/msgp2006_all-proposed.pdf. 
 31 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Tex. Cities Coal. on Stormwater v. EPA, 
541 U.S. 1085 (2004).  The Phase II Rule was challenged in separate actions in the Fifth, 
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, which were subsequently consolidated before the Ninth Circuit.  
Id. at 843. 
 32 Memorandum, “Implementing the Partial Remand of the Stormwater Phase II 
Regulations Regarding Notices of Intent & NPDES General Permitting for Phase II 
MS4s,” dated April 16, 2006, from James A. Hanlon, Director, EPA Office of Wastewater 
Management to Water Management Division Directors, Regions I-X, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/hanlonphase2apr14signed.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) 
[hereinafter Hanlon, Memorandum]. 
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Another reason why timely resolution is essential involves 
enforcement.  If the issuance of the general permit is legally chal-
lengeable for the noncompliance with the public hearing re-
quirement, litigation under the citizen suit provisions of the 
CWA is predictable.33  Future EPA and state administrative en-
forcement practices also are potentially affected.  Regulatory en-
forcement against storm water violators assumes a validly issued 
permit.  The failure to provide a “required” public hearing on 
NOIs and SWPPPs squarely challenges the validity of this as-
sumption. 
II. INDUSTRY COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
Failure to comply with the provisions of the CWA applicable 
to storm water management may trigger significant civil34 and 
criminal sanctions.35  The potential application of these sanctions 
to violators provides regulators with the necessary regulatory 
hammer to assure compliance with the law.  This regulatory 
hammer is increasingly being used. 
Industry compliance with the construction storm water regu-
lations has been slow.  The EPA estimated construction activities 
exceed 62,000 starts per year, but that fewer than 20,000 con-
struction sites applied for storm water coverage in 1999.36  States 
also recognized the compliance problem.  In California, for exam-
ple, the legislature acted by requiring Regional Water Boards to 
annually identify dischargers who had not obtained coverage un-
der an appropriate storm water permit.37  Non-filers were recog-
nized as a serious compliance problem, but they were not the 
only concern: many builders who applied for industrial storm wa-
ter permits were also found to be in non-compliance with their 
submitted NOI.38  Additional regulatory action to assure compli-
ance with the mandates of the CWA was needed.  As a result, the 
EPA has increased its enforcement focus on development and 
 
 33 Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000). 
 34 Clean Water Act § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2000) (Any person who violates any 
section of this Title or any order issued by the Administrator shall be subject to a civil 
penalty not to exceed $25,000 per day for each violation.). 
 35 Clean Water Act § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000).  For example, a criminal fine 
in the amount of $600,000 for industrial runoff from a collection pit to the Los Angeles 
and San Gabriel Rivers was imposed on a Southern California soft drink bottler, 7-Up/RC 
Bottling.  Wendy Thermos, Bottler to Pay $1 Million for Pollution of 2 Rivers; Runoff was 
harmful to humans and marine life, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at B5. 
 36 Memorandum from Walker B. Smith, Director, EPA Office of Regulatory En-
forcement, 2003 Storm Water Compliance and Enforcement Strategy, at 12 (Aug. 14, 
2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/cwa/stwenf 
strategy2003.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Walker B. Smith]. 
 37 CAL. WATER CODE § 13399.30(a)(1). 
 38 Memorandum from Walker B. Smith, supra note 36, at 1. 
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construction activities.39 
Storm water regulation of these activities has been identified 
as an EPA enforcement priority, with particular attention on 
large-scale developers exhibiting a corporate-wide pattern of non-
compliance.40  Commercial developers of “big-box” stores and 
large national residential builders41 are currently high profile en-
forcement targets.42  The building industry is now in the en-
forcement cross hairs of the EPA and state regulators. 
The EPA has initiated numerous enforcement actions seek-
ing millions of dollars in civil penalties from developers and 
builders for failing either to secure a storm water permit, so-
called non-filers, or for failing to comply with its terms.  In 2004, 
for example, the U.S. Department of Justice and the EPA, along 
with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Delaware, and 
the states of Tennessee and Utah reached a settlement for storm 
water discharge violations at Wal-Mart store construction sites 
across the country.43  According to the factual allegations in the 
EPA’s complaint, Wal-Mart constructs more than one hundred 
Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart Supercenter and Sam’s Club stores per 
year.44  As a result of this enforcement action, Wal-Mart agreed 
to pay a $3.1 million civil penalty and to reduce storm water run-
off at its sites by instituting better control measures.45 
States are also actively pursuing construction storm water 
violations.  In 2005, the San Diego Regional Water Board issued 
a $1.2 million administrative civil liability complaint46 to JRMC 
 
 39 Region 4 Continues Systematic Enforcement of Storm Water Violations (American 
Bar Ass’n Envt’l. Crimes & Enforcement Comm.), Oct. 2004, at 19.  See also Memoran-
dum Eric V. Schaeffer, Director, Office of Regulatory Enforcement to Water Management 
Division Directors Regions I-X (Jan. 18, 2000), available at http://www.epa. 
gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/cwa/stmwtrstra.pdf. 
 40 Rafe Petersen, Regulation of Stormwater Pollution: An Area of Increasing Impor-
tance to the Construction Industry, 19 PROB. & PROP. 45 (2005); see generally Memoran-
dum from Walker B. Smith, supra note 36, at 3. 
 41 United States v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 04-301 (D. Del. Oct. 14, 2004) (order 
requiring all parties to submit further explanations as to why the court should approve 
consent decree). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Consent Decree, United States v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (D. Del. 2004), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/decrees/civil/cwa/walmart2-cd.pdf. 
 44 Complaint at ¶ 24, United States v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., available at http:// 
cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/cases/ (Search: Wal-Mart II Storm Water Settlement). 
 45 Consent Decree, United States v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., supra note 43.  This set-
tlement was the second enforcement action resulting in a settlement with Wal-Mart for 
violations of the Clean Water Act.  In 2001, Wal-Mart and several contractors entered into 
a settlement with the U.S. to address storm water violations at 17 sites in several states.  
The 2001 settlement included a penalty of $1 million and required Wal-Mart to develop a 
storm water training program for its contractors and to inspect and oversee storm water 
controls at construction sites.  Complaint at ¶¶ 22–23, United States v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., supra note 44. 
 46 Complaint, No. R9-2005-0059 (Mar. 10, 2005); see also the 2005 news report on the 
04) 265-312 MINAN (PAGENUM, TOC, HYPH, EN&EM).DOC 6/30/2006 12:54:51 PM 
2006] General Industrial Storm Water Permits 273 
Real Estate, Inc. for alleged violations at the 186-acre Escondido 
Research and Technology Center (ERTC) construction site in Es-
condido, California.47  The complaint alleged ongoing violations of 
the California Construction Storm Water Permit (CCSWP),48 
including: 82 days of sediment discharge to Escondido Creek directly 
or indirectly via the City of Escondido’s Municipal Separate Storm 
Sewer System (MS4), 166 days of inadequately installed Best Man-
agement Practices (BMPs), at least 16 days of failure to collect and 
analyze storm water runoff and to submit monitoring reports, and 
failure to assess BMPs after storm events.49 
III. THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND WATER QUALITY 
In late August of 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated a por-
tion of the coastal region of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama 
that President Bush estimated to be larger than the size of Great 
Britain.50  Several weeks later, Hurricane Rita slammed into 
Texas and Louisiana creating further havoc in the region.51  The 
combined effects from these storm events have been immense in 
terms of human life, personal suffering, and economic loss.52  Re-
pairing the damage to the public infrastructure from these hurri-
canes will take years, and many parts of the coastal region will 
never be the same. 
 
developers of a 1,000-acre subdivision paying a $575,000 fine for violations of California 
storm water regulations, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sacramento, CA) available at 
http://www.sacbee.com/content/news/story/13737215p-14579232c/. 
 47 See SAN DIEGO REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD, EXECUTIVE OFFICER’S 
REPORT 9 (May 11, 2005), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/rwqcb9/eo_report/reports/ 
5-11-05%20eo.pdf. 
 48 Complaint, No. R9-2005-0059, supra note 46; National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES) General Permit for Storm Water Discharges Associated with 
Construction Activity (General Permit), Water Quality Order No. 99-08-DWQ.  The 
CCSWP, part of Order No. 99-08-DWQ, is NPDES Permit No. CAS000002, “Waste Dis-
charge Requirements (WDRS) for Discharges of Storm Water Runoff Associated with 
Construction Activity,” available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/docs/ 
finalconstpermit.pdf [hereinafter Order No. 99-08].  Revisions to Order 99-08 are cur-
rently being considered, and a revised storm water order is expected in 2007. 
 49 SAN DIEGO REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD, supra note 47. 
 50 Hurricane Katrina first made landfall just north of Miami, Florida on August 25, 
2005, then again on August 29 along the Central Gulf Coast near New Orleans, Louisi-
ana.  To date, Katrina is considered the most destructive and costliest natural disaster in 
the history of the United States.  See Wikipedia, Hurricane Katrina, http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina (last visited Feb. 11, 2006); see also BBC News, 
Bush Boosts Katrina Rescue Force: An Extra 17,000 Troops are Being Sent Into the Area of 
the Southern US Devastated by Hurricane Katrina, Sept. 4, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/americas/4211528.stm. 
 51 Hurricane Rita first struck Florida, and then went on to strike Texas and Louisi-
ana.  “A day prior to landfall, the resultant storm surge also reopened some of the levee 
breaches caused by Hurricane Katrina a month earlier, and reflooded parts of New Or-
leans.  Post-landfall damage was extensive in the coastal areas in southwestern Louisiana 
and extreme southeastern Texas.”  See Wikipedia, Hurricane Rita, http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Rita (last visited Feb. 11, 2006). 
 52 Id. 
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Extreme weather events provide important lessons about 
flood control management and coping with natural disasters.  At 
the less extreme end of the weather spectrum, these storm events 
should also focus attention on the importance of effective storm 
water planning and management.53 
These hurricanes are contemporary reminders of the impor-
tance of clean water as a basic human need, one that is also es-
sential to the nation’s health, economy, security, and ecology. A 
fundamental thesis can be advanced.  Clean water is critical to 
human health and welfare, to preserving habitat and ecological 
diversity, and to insuring viable populations of wildlife and 
aquatic life.  A corollary to this thesis is that controlling the pol-
lution in storm water runoff is often directly linked to clean wa-
ter.  Unless effectively regulated, storm water runoff from con-
struction activities has the potential to contaminate and degrade 
the nation’s waters—our streams, creeks, lakes, reservoirs, and 
coastal waters. 
The relationship between construction activities and water 
quality is important to understanding storm water regulation.  
Both the 2003 Pew Oceans Commission54 and the 2004 U.S. 
Commission on Ocean Policy55 documented serious declines in 
the health of oceans and coastal areas, the severe degradation of 
natural resources that depend on healthy oceans and coastal ar-
eas, and the threat to economic activities based on these re-
sources.56  The Pew Report recognized that runoff is a major 
component of this threat to our oceans.57  Runoff from general 
development activities in our coastal regions is causing the de-
cline of ocean wildlife and the collapse of ocean ecosystems.58  
The Pew Report, for example, cites estimates that the oil running 
off our streets and driveways and flowing into the oceans from 
storm water is equal to an Exxon Valdez oil spill every eight 
months.59  The Commission also reports that “more than 13,000 
 
 53 See, e.g., Carol Brzozowski, Hurricanes: The Effects on Stormwater Management, 
STORMWATER: THE JOURNAL FOR SURFACE WATER QUALITY PROFESSIONALS 9 (Mar./Apr. 
2005), available at www.stormh2o.com/sw_0503_hurricanes.html. 
 54 PEW OCEANS COMMISSION, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR 
SEA CHANGE, (May 2003), available at http://www.pewoceans.org [hereinafter AMERICA’S 
LIVING OCEANS]. 
 55 U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (Jul. 22, 2004), available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/ 
full_color_rpt/000_ocean_full_report.pdf [hereinafter OCEAN BLUEPRINT]. 
 56 AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS, supra note 54, at v; OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 55, 
at 1. 
 57 AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS, supra note 54 at vi. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id.  In 1989, the grounding of the ship Exxon Valdez caused the release of over 11 
million gallons of oil in Alaska’s water and polluted some 1200 miles of shoreline.  Largely 
in response to this event, Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), which 
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beaches were closed or under pollution advisories in 2001 [from 
runoff,] an increase of 20 percent from the [previous year].”60  
The U.S. Commission Report also observes that increased devel-
opment increases sediment flows and contributes to coastal water 
pollution.61 
States have also recognized runoff as a major source of im-
paired water quality.62  Every state and every major watershed 
in the United States is under similar assault from unregulated or 
under-regulated sources of runoff.63  In northern Wisconsin, the 
runoff assault is from dairy farms, in North Carolina, it is from 
hogs, and in Oregon, it is from clear-cutting of forests.64  Housing 
and urban development also contribute to the runoff problem in 
many watersheds throughout the nation.65  The California legis-
lature has stated that unregulated storm water runoff is a lead-
ing cause of contamination of its surface water and groundwa-
ter.66 
In the National Water Quality Inventory: 2000 Report67 to 
Congress, the EPA cites urban storm water runoff and discharges 
from storm sewers as primary causes of impaired water quality.68  
The 2000 Report notes that “[t]hese sources contributed to 13 
percent of impaired rivers and streams, 18 percent of impaired 
lakes, 55 percent of impaired ocean shorelines, and 32 percent of 
impaired estuaries.” 69  Little doubt exists as to the connection 
 
contains nine separate titles ranging from general provisions regarding oil pollution down 
to specific requirements.  33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–2761 (West 2001). 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that American households generate 
193 million gallons of used oil annually, some of which is improperly disposed of.  It esti-
mates that households improperly dump the equivalent of 17 Exxon Valdez oil spills each 
year.  See EPA, Featured Story: Stormwater Runoff, available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
Region9/water/npdes/stormwater-feature.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 
 60 AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS, supra note 54, at 4. 
 61 OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 55, at 14–15. 
 62 See, e.g., OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY 
AND IMPLEMENTATION 4 (Envtl. Law Inst., 2d ed. 2002). 
 63 Id.  Basing regulation on watershed principles is further complicated by the fact 
that political boundaries and administrative institutions typically do not follow the natu-
ral topographical configuration of watersheds.  In California, for example, “the aver-
age . . . county includes portions of six different watersheds.”  John T. Woolley et al., The 
California Watershed Movement: Science and the Politics of Place, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
133, 136 (2002). 
 64 HOUCK, supra note 62. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARDS & REGIONAL WATER QUALITY 
CONTROL BOARDS, STRATEGIC PLAN 7 (Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www. 
waterboards.ca.gov/strategicplan/docs/01strategic_plan.pdf. 
 67 National Water Quality Inventory: 2000 Report (EPA Aug. 2002), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/305b/2000report/. 
 68 Id. at ES-3; EPA, United States v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Fact Sheet, at 3 (May 12, 
2004) (printed as revised Dec. 28, 2004), available at  
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/cwa/walmart2-fs.pdf. 
 69 EPA, U.S. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Fact Sheet, supra note 68, at 3. 
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between storm water runoff and water quality. 
The EPA maintains that uncontrolled storm water runoff 
from industrial facilities and construction sites harms both the 
environment and public health.70  The EPA argues that “[s]everal 
studies reveal that storm water runoff from urban areas can in-
clude a variety of pollutants, such as sediment, bacteria, organic 
nutrients, hydrocarbons, metals, oil and grease.”71 
While the links between construction activities, storm water 
runoff, and impaired water quality seem well established, the 
construction industry argues that a more nuanced analysis is 
important to considering water quality priorities.72  It argues that 
the EPA’s position on the role of the construction industry con-
fuses the categories of sources contributing to the storm water 
runoff problem.73  The industry maintains that the category of 
“‘urban runoff and storm sewers,’” which is the focus of much of 
the policy and priority discussion by the EPA, is entirely different 
from the category of “‘storm water runoff from industrial and 
construction sites.’”74  It contends that the admittedly dangerous 
content of urban runoff, which often includes “pathogens, oil and 
grease, and metals are seldom found in storm water runoff from 
construction sites.”75 
The construction industry seeks to buttress its claim that the 
EPA is firing at the wrong target by citing the EPA’s own re-
search.  This research reveals that 
[c]onstruction activities during site development are not believed to be 
major contributors of these contaminants [oil and grease] to storm wa-
ter runoff.  Improper operation and maintenance of construction 
equipment at construction sites, as well as poor housekeeping prac-
tices (e.g., improper storage of oil and gasoline products), could lead to 
leakage or spillage of products that contain hydrocarbons, but these 
incidents would likely be small in magnitude and managed before off-
site contamination could occur.76 
In short, the building industry complains that often repeated 
generalizations about the runoff problem are misdirected against 
the construction industry, and that the scientific links between 
construction activities and the urban runoff, and the storm water 
 
 70 Id. at 2–4. 
 71 Id. at 2. 
 72 See, e.g., letter from Gerald M. Howard, Executive Vice President & CEO, Na-
tional Association of Home Builders, to Information Quality Guidelines Staff (July 9, 
2004), at 3. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 75 Id. at 3–4. 
 76 EPA, Environmental Assessment of Construction and Development Proposed Efflu-
ent Guidelines (June 2002), at 2–11. 
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problem are substantially missing.77  From the building indus-
try’s perspective, the bottom line is clear: “[i]f [the] EPA intends 
to continue to single out residential builders for enforcement at-
tention, [the] EPA will need to provide a different justification.”78 
However, additional justifications for focusing on the con-
struction industry do exist to support the mandate for regulatory 
action.  Oftentimes, the first activity undertaken at a construc-
tion site involves preparing the land by removing unnecessary 
vegetation and grading.79  This means that the exposed soil is 
highly susceptible to erosion from storm events.  Additional con-
struction activities typically follow that reduce the permeability 
of the soil to naturally absorb precipitation, such as building 
roads and sidewalks.  Thus, and perhaps not surprisingly, ero-
sion and sediment transfer to rivers, streams, and other receiving 
waters during and after construction is a well documented phe-
nomenon affecting water quality.80 
The water quality problems from erosion include increased 
turbidity, which results in the blockage of light as well as de-
creased oxygen, in the receiving waters.81  This condition may re-
sult “in loss of in-stream habitat for fish and other aquatic spe-
cies” and plants.82  In addition, sediment-laden runoff carried to 
the receiving waters can “kill fish directly, destroy spawning 
beds, and suffocate fish eggs and bottom dwelling organisms.”83  
Sediment discharges from construction sites to MS4 conveyance 
systems also have the potential to clog pipes and pumps, and im-
pair the systems’ effectiveness. 
Most construction activities also alter the natural landscape 
through compaction and excavation.84  These necessary building 
activities also increase the potential for runoff and erosion from 
construction sites, thus increasing the potential for sediment 
transport to the receiving waters.85  In California, the State Wa-
 
 77 Letter from Gerald M. Howard, supra note 72, at 8. 
 78 Id. at 11. 
 79 40 C.F.R § 122.26(15)(i) states that storm water discharges from “small construc-
tion activity does not include routine [road] maintenance that is performed to maintain 
the original line and grade, hydraulic capacity, or original purpose of the facility.”  Id.  To 
the extent that road construction and maintenance involves the development of the land 
for agricultural activities, it may be exempt by exclusion from the definition of a PS.  
Clean Water Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000) (defining point source, or PS).  See 
also, 63 Fed. Reg. 7858, 7876 (Feb. 17, 1998) (neither agricultural runoff nor development 
of land for agricultural purposes are regulated by the NPDES program). 
 80 See, e.g., National Water Quality Inventory: 2000 Report, supra note 67, at Table 
A-4 (providing data from various locations, including site-specific data). 
 81 EPA, U.S. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Fact Sheet, supra note 68, at 3. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
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ter Board has found that construction activities86 are a potential 
significant source of pollutants and have the reasonable potential 
to contribute to an excursion above the Water Quality Standards 
(WQSs)87 for sediment.88 
The movement of trucks and heavy construction equipment 
also can “track” soil to adjacent streets in much the same way 
that dirt and mud can be “tracked” into a house from outside dur-
ing and after rain events unless preventive steps are taken.  To 
the extent that pollutants other than sediment89 are physically 
present, such as construction debris and other building-related 
detritus, they also may be carried off the site to the receiving wa-
ters by the storm water flows unless effectively controlled.90 
Notwithstanding the protests from the building industry, the 
focus on the construction industry is appropriate for another rea-
son.  Many of the enforcement claims against the construction 
industry are for failing to file for NPDES permits as required by 
the CWA.91  In these cases, the appropriateness of the focus is 
straightforward.  The CWA requires that action be taken against 
such non-filers.92  In addition, storm water source control and pol-
lution prevention, as distinguished from remediating the water 
quality impairment after the fact, is desirable as a matter of pub-
lic policy.  The public benefits of prevention and control are only 
available after non-filers are brought within the regulatory 
framework of the NPDES storm water permitting program. 
Once a construction company files a NOI, the next regulatory 
challenge becomes assuring compliance with the CGP require-
ments.  This assurance normally is accomplished through inspec-
tion and, if necessary, enforcement.  Regulatory enforcement ac-
tions challenging the adequacy of the BMPs employed at a 
 
 86 Typical construction activities with the potential to produce off-site sediment 
transfers include, for example, exposed soil areas, active grading areas, poorly stabilized 
slopes, the lack of perimeter controls, areas of concentrated flow to unprotected soils, and 
unprotected soil stockpiles.  Order No. 99-08, supra note 48. 
 87 The CWA provides for WQSs and associated implementation plans.  Clean Water 
Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000). 
 88 Order No. 99-08, Water Discharge Requirements (General Permit), at ¶ 8 (1999), 
available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/construction.html. 
 89 The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. 
No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (Jan. 11, 2002), which amended the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), encourages the devel-
opment of contaminated commercial property.  A “brownfield” is “real property the expan-
sion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential 
presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”  CERCLA § 101(39)(A), 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (2000).  Storm water runoff from “brownfield” re-development raises 
special concerns beyond sediment transfers. 
 90 U.S. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Fact Sheet, supra note 68, at 3. 
 91 Petersen, supra note 40, at 46. 
 92 Clean Water Act § 402(b)(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7) (2000). 
04) 265-312 MINAN (PAGENUM, TOC, HYPH, EN&EM).DOC 6/30/2006 12:54:51 PM 
2006] General Industrial Storm Water Permits 279 
particular construction site by an owner or operator often involve 
some degree of regulatory discretion in determining compliance.93  




Sediment from construction site to unnamed tributary of Santa Gertrudis 
Creek.  Roripaugh Ranch Project, Riverside County, California, March 17, 
2003.94  
Storm drain inlet is not protected by adequate BMPs to prevent sediment from 
entering the storm drain.  Pulte Homes Construction site, Eastlake, California, 
 
 93 Petersen, supra note 40, at 46.  “The magnitude of this interpretation of a permit 
violation is seen when one considers that a large site may have hundreds of different 
BMPs in place.”  Id. at 47. 
 94 Source on file with author. 
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February 3, 2004.95 
IV.  THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND CLEAN WATER ACT 
(CWA) STORM WATER REGULATION 
The discretion invested in regulatory agencies to regulate 
the storm water discharges from construction activities requires 
an understanding of the structure of the CWA.  The CWA pro-
vides that the “discharge”96 of any “pollutant”97 into “navigable 
waters”98 from a “point source” (PS)99 is unlawful unless it is in 
compliance with an NPDES permit.100  These four touchstones 
(discharge, pollutant, navigable waters, and point source) are 
prerequisites to the application of the NPDES Program.101  How-
ever, an important statutory exemption from the definition of PS 
 
 95 Source on file with author. 
 96 Clean Water Act § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (12) (2000) (“The term ‘discharge of a 
pollutant’ and the term ‘discharge of pollutants’ each means (A) any addition of any pol-
lutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to the 
waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or 
other floating craft.”). 
 97 The term “pollutant” is broadly defined in Clean Water Act § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(6) (2000) (“The term ‘pollutant’ means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator resi-
due, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, 
radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and 
industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.”). 
 98 The constitutional basis for the Clean Water Act is the Commerce Clause.  U.S. 
Const. Art. I, § 8.  For much of the nation’s history, Congress believed the commerce 
power applied only to navigable waters.  Congress used this traditional touchstone in the 
CWA, but also stretched the meaning of “navigable waters.”  Thus, as used in the CWA 
the term “navigable waters” broadly “means the waters of the United States, including 
the territorial seas.”  Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).  The term 
“navigable waters” has been broadly applied to “waters” that are not traditionally naviga-
ble.  See e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123–24 
(1985) (holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are subject to CWA jurisdic-
tion). 
Determining the precise boundaries of the meaning of the term “navigable waters” for ju-
risdictional purposes has proven illusive as evidenced by the varying interpretations of 
the meaning and application of the decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County (SWANCC) v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.  531 U.S. 159 (2001).  In 
2006, the Supreme Court will hear two cases from the Sixth Circuit involving the touch-
stone of “navigable waters” and its application to wetlands.  Carabell v. United States 
Army Corps of Engineers, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted Carabell v. United 
States Army Corps of Engineers, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005) and United States v. Rapanos, 376 
F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 414 (2005).  
The Rapanos case describes the varying interpretations of the SWANCC decision by the 
federal appellate courts.  Id. at 638.  The Supreme Court decisions in Carabell and Ra-
panos are apt to have important consequences to the building industry because the dis-
charge of storm water to navigable waters is a prerequisite to the assertion of jurisdiction 
under the CWA. 
 99 Clean Water Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000) (“The term ‘point source’ 
means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any 
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, con-
centrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollut-
ants are or may be discharged.”). 
 100 Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000). 
 101 Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000) (describing the NPDES system). 
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exists for agricultural storm water discharges.102 
In 1987, CWA Section 402(p) expressly designated storm 
sewer discharges to navigable waters as “point sources.”103  As a 
result, both MS4 and industrial storm water dischargers were 
expressly identified as being subject to the NPDES permit pro-
gram requirements of the CWA.104  This addition to the law was 
an important step in storm water regulation. 
The EPA has defined storm water discharges associated with 
industrial activity in a comprehensive manner.  The definition 
includes the addition of any pollutant from any system used for 
collecting and conveying storm water within eleven industrial 
categories.105  Construction activities, subject to some statutory 
exceptions,106 are subject to the industrial storm water permit-
ting requirements of Section 402(p).107  The most recent set of 
federal regulations, which went into effect in 2003, expanded the 
scope of coverage to construction activities that disturb from one 
to five acres.108  Construction activities disturbing five acres or 
more were regulated prior to 2003.109 
 A NPDES permit contains various standard conditions, 
such as those relating to monitoring and reporting.110  One of the 
most important permit conditions relates to the “effluent limita-
 
 102 Clean Water Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).  The application of the 
agricultural exemption to runoff has created controversy.  The EPA has narrowly con-
strued this storm water exclusion to apply to the runoff from land applications of fertiliz-
ers only to the extent that the application is in accordance with proper agricultural prac-
tices.  66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 3029–30 (Jan. 12, 2001).  See also Concerned Area Residents for 
the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that runoff during a rain 
event from a Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO) that was primarily caused 
by the excessive application of liquid manure to the land may violate the CWA notwith-
standing the storm water exemption).  This decision by the EPA applies to CAFOs which 
are included within the statutory definition of PS.  Clean Water Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(14) (2000) (identifying a CAFO as a point source). 
In California, the term “waste discharge requirements” is the equivalent of the term 
“permits” as used in the CWA.  CAL. WATER CODE § 13374.  While federal law contains a 
general exemption for agricultural activities that do not fit within the CAFO category, 
state law may not be as generous.  The California Water Code, for example, provides that 
anyone discharging or proposing to discharge waste that could affect water quality must 
file a Report of Waste Discharge (ROWD).  CAL. WATER CODE § 13260.  Unlike federal 
law, no automatic exemption from this requirement exists.  Thus, a ROWD is required 
under state law for irrigation return flows and storm water runoff from agricultural lands 
unless a waiver is granted under the provisions contained in Water Code § 13269. 
 103 Clean Water Act § 402(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2000). 
 104 Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(A)-(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(A)-(B) (2000). 
 105 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.26(b)(14)(i)-(xi) (2004). 
 106 Clean Water Act § 402(l), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l) (2000). 
 107 Clean Water Act § 402(p). 
 108 Small construction activities may apply for a waiver from the NPDES permitting 
requirements contained in the General Permit.  NPDES General Permit, supra note 15 
Construction Activities, at ¶1.4, Appendix D. 
 109 40 C.F.R. § 122 (2003). 
 110 See NPDES General Permit, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 4.3, 9(A)(1)(d). 
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tion” on the quantities or concentrations of pollutants that can be 
legally discharged pursuant to Section 301.111  The term “effluent 
limitation” is broadly defined, and encompasses “any restric-
tion . . . on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, 
physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged 
from point sources into navigable waters” of the United States.112 
 Two types of effluent limitation exist and operate in tan-
dem.  One type is prescribed by the EPA using nationally uni-
form, technology-based requirements.113  When a technology-
based effluent limitation has not been promulgated, which is the 
situation with respect to construction storm water regulation, the 
permitting authority must use its best professional judgment 
(BPJ) in formulating the effluent limitation.114  The other type is 
a water quality-based effluent limitation (WQBEL) derived from 
the impact of the discharge on the receiving water.115  Congress 
recognized that both types of limitation were necessary because 
meeting technology-based standards at a point of discharge was 
no guarantee that the water quality in the receiving water would 
not degrade below acceptable levels.116  Technology-based re-
quirements do not consider cumulative impacts of a discharge on 
the receiving water, whereas WQBELs do.117 
Technology-based limitations, which are derived from tech-
nological and economic considerations for particular discharge 
categories,118 are based on the pollution reducing performance 
achieved by using established pollution control technologies.119  
As a general matter, technology-based limitations, which vary by 
the nature of the pollutant being discharged, are commonly ex-
 
 111 Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000). 
 112 Clean Water Act § 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (2000). 
 113 Clean Water Act §§ 301(b)(1)(A), (2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A), (2)(A) (2000).  
The EPA is responsible for establishing effluent limitations for various types of point 
sources based on what the available technology could accomplish.  This approach avoids 
the technical difficulty of evaluating individual effluent limits for discharges.  JAMES 
SALZMAN AND BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 129 (2003). 
 114 See Clean Water Act § 402(a)(1)(B) (The Administrator may issue a permit after 
an entity meets “such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry 
out the provisions of this Act.”), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(B) (2000); see also 40 C.F.R. § 
125.3(d) (2004) (listing factors that the permit writer must consider in setting case-by-
case limitations). 
 115 See Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000). 
 116 See EPA v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976). 
 117 See Clean Water Act § 304(b)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (2000). 
 118 See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977) (holding, 
among other things, that effluent limitations for existing plant sources for 1977 and 1983 
are to be set by regulation with some allowances “made for variations in individual 
plants,” but not solely on an individual basis during the permit issuance process). 
 119 See Clean Water Act § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2000); see also 40 C.F.R. § 
122.44 (2004). 
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pressed in numeric or narrative terms.120  As one might expect, a 
numeric criterion establishes a quantitative limitation on pollut-
ant concentrations or levels, whereas a narrative criterion is a 
descriptive, non-numeric limitation.121 
The relevant technology used to determine a technology-
based limitation depends on whether the discharged pollutant is 
classified as “toxic,”122 “conventional,”123 or “nonconventional.”124  
Once the effluent limitation is determined for the type of pollut-
ant based on the appropriate technology, such as Best Available 
Technology (BAT), the PS discharger may comply with the efflu-
ent limitation in whatever way it chooses.125  The particular 
technology employed is left to the discretion of the discharger.126 
This approach to determining an effluent limitation or com-
pliance standard is considered “performance-based” because the 
EPA or state regulatory agency is concerned solely with perform-
ance, and not with the specific processes or management tech-
niques employed by the discharger to meet the effluent limita-
tion.127  In fact, prescriptive performance methods, such as 
specifying the process or technique, may be precluded.128 
In contrast, WQBELs129 are based on the amount of pollut-
ants allowed in a defined receiving water body130 after taking into 
 
 120 BMPs may be used when “[a]uthorized under section 402(p) of the CWA for the 
control of storm water discharges [or when] [n]umeric effluent limitations are infeasible.”  
40 C.F.R. § 122.44(k)(2)-(3) (2004).  The EPA recently decided against adopting effluent 
limitation guidelines for storm water discharges associated with construction activity, and 
instead decided to rely on “existing programs, regulations, and initiatives at the Federal, 
State, and local level.”  40 C.F.R § 450 (2004). 
The issue of whether direct discharges of toxic pollutants from non-construction, in-
dustrial storm water activities is subject to numeric limitations is currently on appeal be-
fore the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District in Divers’ Envtl. 
Conservation Org. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., San Diego Superior Court, Case No. 
GIC819689 (case no. D046112) (2005). 
 121 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b) (2004). 
 122 Clean Water Act § 307(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (2000) (referring to a list of 
toxic pollutants subject to the CWA). 
 123 Clean Water Act § 304(a)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4) (2000) (conventional pollutants 
are pollutants that include, but are not limited to “pollutants classified as biological oxy-
gen demanding, suspended solids, fecal coliform, and pH.”). 
 124 Clean Water Act § 301(g)(4)(B)(iv), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(4)(B)(iv) (2000) (Pollutants 
that are not specifically classified as “toxic” or “conventional” are considered “nonconven-
tional.”). 
 125 See Clean Water Act §§ 301(b)(2)(A), 307(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 
1317(a)(2) (2000). 
 126 See Clean Water Act § 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A). 
 127 Clean Water Act § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (2000). 
 128 CAL. WATER CODE § 13360 (2005) (prohibits waste discharge requirements from 
specifying the “design, location, type of construction, or particular manner” of compli-
ance). 
 129 See Clean Water Act § 303(e)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3)(A) (2000). 
 130 See Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000) (establishing states’ roles 
in determining water quality standards). 
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account the beneficial uses of the receiving water and its assimi-
lative pollutant capacity.131  They are calculated based on the im-
pact of the waste discharge.132  Water Quality Standards 
(WQSs)133 serve as a general baseline for deriving WQBELs.134 
WQSs also serve an additional function beyond their connec-
tion to WQBELs.  The CWA requires states to identify all water 
bodies for which technology-based effluent limitations are insuf-
ficient to meet WQSs.135  Thus, WQSs also provide the baseline 
for remedial action under the Total Maximum Daily Load 
(TMDL) program.136  The connection between WQSs and TMDLs 
is relevant to construction activities because sediment is a com-
monly recognized pollutant that has triggered Section 303(d), 
TMDL listings.137 
WQBELs are established at levels designed to ensure that 
WQSs are not exceeded in the receiving water.138  One of the fac-
tors in determining a WQBEL is the extent to which the assimi-
lative capacity of the receiving waters will be allowed.139  If a 
WQBEL is calculated without any allowance for assimilative ca-
pacity of the receiving waters, a discharge in excess of the 
WQBEL would constitute a permit violation without exceeding 
the WQS.  Thus, the often repeated statement that “simply put, 
WQBEL’s implement [WQSs]” 140 is potentially misleading. 
The timing and variability of the pollutants in storm water 
discharges present a different set of concerns than those associ-
ated with a typical steady-state discharge common to many in-
dustrial wastewater discharges.  Construction activities are both 
 
 131 See Clean Water Act § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (2000). 
 132 Clean Water Act § 102(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000) (mandating that 
state planning agencies establish a comprehensive pollution control plan). 
 133 In California, WQSs are established through regional water quality control man-
agement plans, commonly known as basin plans, which are adopted by the appropriate 
Regional Water Board after a public hearing.  CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13240, 13244.  Basin 
plans become effective upon approval by the State Water Board.  CAL. WATER CODE § 
13245. 
 134 See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 106 (1992) (holding that the EPA’s re-
quirement that NPDES dischargers must comply with downstream states’ WQS was a 
reasonable exercise of the agency’s statutory discretion). 
 135 Clean Water Act § 303(d)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (2000); see also 40 C.F.R. 
§ 130(h) (2004). 
 136 Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000).  A TMDL is a written, quan-
titative plan and analysis for attaining and maintaining WQS for a specific body of water 
and pollutant.  40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i) (2005). 
 137 Water bodies listed under Section 303(d) for sediment are identified in Order No. 
99-08, supra note 48, at Attachment 3, available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/ 
construction.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2006). 
 138 See Clean Water Act § 303(d)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1) (2000). 
 139 Clean Water Act § 303(d)(1)(D), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(D) (2000). 
 140 See e.g., Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 34 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 396, 399 (1st Dist. 2005). 
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dynamic and itinerant.  They are dynamic because the palette of 
potential pollutants changes as a construction project progresses 
toward completion.141  But they are also itinerant because once 
the construction project is finished, the builder typically moves to 
a new location with different site-specific concerns. 
Storm water permits attempt to take into consideration 
these different concerns by prohibiting discharges that cause or 
contribute to the exceedence of WQSs in the receiving water.142  
But this approach creates some regulatory uncertainty because 
WQSs do not easily translate into numeric WQBELs that can be 
applied at the discharge point or PS.  Simply using the numeric 
component of a WQS would result in most, if not all, storm water 
discharges violating the WQBEL, which would expose the build-
ers to regulatory enforcement actions. 
Within this effluent limitation framework, Congress estab-
lished a two-phased approach to storm water regulation when it 
added Section 402(p).143  In 1990, the EPA adopted the Phase I 
final regulations for storm water discharges associated with in-
dustrial activities.144  These regulations required construction 
sites larger than five acres to secure NPDES storm water permits 
for PS discharges to waters of the United States.145 
The regulatory ratchet applied to construction activities was 
tightened by the Phase II Rule, which became effective in 
2003.146  It also requires discharges from “small construction 
sites,” as well as dischargers from small MS4s, to be regulated.147  
To avoid “small” developers from gaming the system to avoid 
regulation, sites less than one acre that are part of a larger de-
 
 141 See Lower Platte South Natural Resource District City of Lincoln Watershed 
Management, Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP) Guidance and Design Cri-
teria, at ¶ A4, available at www.lpsnrd.org/docs/Permits/swppp.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 
2006) (because project plans are subject to change, the SWPPP must be dynamic in order 
to be effective). 
 142 NPDES General Permit, supra note 15, at Part 1, ¶ 1.3.C.4; see Clean Water Act § 
402(p)(3)(B)(iii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (p)(3)(B)(iii) (2000) (permits for discharges from munici-
pal storm sewers shall require reduced discharge to the maximum extent practicable); see 
also Bldg. Ind. Ass’n of San Diego County v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 22 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 128, 130–31 (2004), reh’g denied Jan. 4, 2005 (upholding the discretionary authority of 
California to prohibit MS4 discharges that cause or contribute to an exceedence of WQSs). 
 143 Clean Water Act § 402(p)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (p)(4) (2000). 
 144 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified as 40 C.F.R. § 122.26). 
 145 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regula-
tions for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified as 40 
C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(x)).  The EPA’s Phase I Rule regulating construction sites that were 
only in excess of five acres was found “arbitrary and capricious” in Natural Res. Def. 
Council v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1306 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 146 EPA, Phase II Storm Water Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722 (Dec. 8, 1999) (codi-
fied as 40 C.F.R. pts 9, 122, 123, 124). 
 147 Id. 
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velopment plan are also subject to Phase II regulation.148  Thus, 
for example, a developer cannot avoid storm water regulation by 
building a commercial structure on a one-half acre parcel that is 
part of a larger ten-acre retail center. 
The Phase I and II storm water regulations are primarily 
“process-based,” not “performance-based.”149  Performance-based 
standards have yet to be developed and applied to storm water 
discharges, and therefore the permitting authority must develop 
technology-based limitations based on its BPJ.150  Unlike most 
discharges that are controllable at the PS, the makeup of a storm 
water discharge is highly variable depending on the severity of a 
particular storm event, the frequency of storm events, flow rates, 
absorption capacities of surrounding soils, pollutant types and 
concentrations, and so on.  This variability makes storm water 
regulation more complex than the typical NPDES waste dis-
charges from a PS. 
The concentration of pollutants at the point of discharge may 
be sampled.151  But getting a representative storm water sample 
is difficult because of variability in volume and pollutant loading.  
As a result, translating storm water discharge information into a 
workable numeric effluent limitation is difficult.  Consequently, 
the EPA has not yet developed a set of technology-based numeric 
effluent limitations suitable for the regulation of storm water as 
it has for other types of PS discharges.152  Rather, the EPA has 
determined that a “process-based” strategy using BMPs is effec-
tive to adequately meet WQSs.153 
A discharger “may” be considered in compliance with the 
storm water permit by regulators so long as it is implementing 
its identified “process-based” narrative control measures, such as 
the siting, construction and operation of BMPs, contained in the 
SWPPP applicable to the construction site or, if discharging into 
an MS4, with the control measures identified in the MS4 storm 
water management plan (SWMP).154  No guarantee exists with 
 
 148 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(15) (defining “small construction activity”). 
 149 Clean Water Act § 402(a)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(B) (2000); see also 40 C.F.R. 
§ 125.3(d) (2004). 
 150 See Clean Water Act § 402(a)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(B) (2000); see also 40 
C.F.R. § 125.3(d) (2004). 
 151 See e.g., EPA, Load Calculation Protocol, Department of Environment and Con-
servation 2.2.1 (Feb. 2005). 
 152 61 Fed. Reg. 57,425, 57,426 (Nov. 6, 1996) (noting that the CWA does not mandate 
that effluent limitations be numeric). 
 153 EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Storm Water 
Program Questions and Answers (Best Management Practices), Jan. 21, 2004, at 8 (on file 
with author). 
 154 See discussion infra Part VII. Dual Regulation of Construction Storm Water Ac-
tivities. 
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respect to compliance, however.155 
V.  THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN STORM WATER REGULATION 
One might reasonably think that the EPA is at the forefront 
of construction storm water permitting and enforcement.  How-
ever, this view is not exactly the case.156  The CWA recognizes 
that states are fully competent to manage their own water qual-
ity programs so long as they do not compromise federal clean wa-
ter standards.157  Upon application by a state, Section 402(b) of 
the CWA allows the EPA to authorize a state to exercise NPDES 
permitting authority providing the state has the adequate au-
thority to carry out the federal program.158  The EPA has author-
ized most states,159 subject to continuing regulatory oversight by 
the EPA,160 to administer this authority.161  Although this over-
sight pertains to the state’s administration of federal law, a legal 
reservoir of state constitutional authority, independent of the 
CWA authorization, exists to deal with state water quality is-
sues.162 
 
 155 See discussion infra Part VIII. The “Functional” Permit Theory: Divergent Views. 
 156 Construction industry storm water compliance assistance for each state is in-
cluded in Construction Industry Compliance Assistance: Status of the Storm Water Phase 
II Permits as of November 12, 2004, available at http://www.cicacenter.org/ [click on 
stormwater icon] (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
 157 Clean Water Act § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000). 
 158 Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000). 
 159 The following states have approved programs: Alabama; Arizona; Arkansas; Cali-
fornia; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Georgia; Hawaii; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; 
Kansas; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Michigan; Minnesota; Mississippi; Mis-
souri; Montana; Nebraska; Nevada; New Jersey; New York; North Carolina; North Da-
kota; Ohio; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; South Carolina; South Da-
kota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Vermont; Virginia; Washington; West Virginia; Wisconsin; 
Wyoming.  EPA, State NPDES Program Authority, available at http://cfpub2. 
epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).  
 160 The EPA may withdraw its delegation based on the circumstances set forth in 40 
C.F.R. § 123.63(a) (2005). 
 161 See CAL. WATER CODE § 13370(c) (2004).  This section provides: 
It is in the interest of the people of the state, in order to avoid direct regulation 
by the federal government of persons already subject to regulation under state 
law pursuant to this division, to enact this chapter in order to authorize the 
state to implement the provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
[CWA] and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, and federal 
regulations and guidelines issued pursuant thereto, provided, that the state 
board shall request federal funding under the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act [CWA] for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities under this pro-
gram.   
Id. 
 162 The California Supreme Court recently rejected the contention of the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council (NRDC) that a state exercising the discretionary authority rec-
ognized by the CWA acts pursuant to federal law based on the theory that the CWA in-
corporates state water policy into federal law.  City of Burbank v. State Water Res. 
Control Bd., 108 P.3d 862, 870 (2005) (“Nothing in the federal Clean Water Act suggests 
that a state is free to disregard or to weaken the federal requirements for clean water 
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Most states have EPA-approved programs.163  This fact 
means that those states administering the industrial storm wa-
ter provisions are, as a practical matter, at the forefront of both 
the permitting and the enforcement efforts.  To the extent that 
an enforcement action against a large-scale, development opera-
tion involves multiple states, the EPA will assume the controlling 
enforcement role, although coordination with state regulators is 
essential.164 
In late 2005, the EPA’s state-authorization process hit a new 
legal obstacle.  In Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA,165 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the EPA had taken inconsistent positions during 
litigation on its legal obligation to consult, pursuant to Section 7 
of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), with the federal Fish and 
Wildlife Service in deciding to transfer CWA permitting author-
ity to Arizona.166  Although the case was remanded to the EPA to 
articulate a coherent and consistent position, which is an argu-
able basis for narrowly applying the decision, the court was 
clearly of the opinion that the EPA was unreasonable in conclud-
ing that it was required to disregard the impact of the CWA per-
mitting transfer on species protected by the ESA.167  To the ex-
tent that the EPA does not comply with the federal consultation 
provisions of the ESA in deciding to approve an NPDES permit-
ting transfer to the state, such a transfer may be in legal jeop-
ardy.168 
VI.  THE CALIFORNIA “GENERAL CONSTRUCTION  
STORM WATER PERMIT” 
The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act is the princi-
pal law governing water quality in California.169  It establishes a 
comprehensive program to protect water quality under the aus-
pices of the State Water Board and nine semi-autonomous Re-
gional Water Boards.170  In Chapter 5.5 of Porter-Cologne, the 
legislature established a program to comply with the provisions 
 
when an NPDES permit holder alleges that compliance with those requirements will be 
too costly.”). 
 163 See EPA, State NPDES Program Authority, supra note 159. 
 164 National Science & Technology Center, Bureau of Land Management, Water 
Quality Law Summary, Chapter 4: The Total Maximum Daily Load Program, at 5, avail-
able at http://www.blm.gov/nstc/WaterLaws/Chap4.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
 165 Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 166 See id. at 959–60 (noting that the EPA’s positions in litigation were inconsistent, 
but that its positions during administrative processes were consistent). 
 167 Id. at 960–61. 
 168 Whether the Defenders of Wildlife decision will or should trigger the re-opening of 
earlier EPA transfers to other states is beyond the scope of this article. 
 169 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000–14958 (2005). 
 170 See CAL. WATER CODE § 13001 (2005), Order No. 99-08, supra note 48. 
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of the CWA.171  As a result, California has been authorized by the 
EPA to administer the federal NPDES program, including its 
storm water provisions.172  Porter-Cologne also contains a sepa-
rate chapter on storm water enforcement practices that is sup-
plementary173 to the Chapter 5.5 provisions authorizing admini-
stration of the federal program.174 
In California, construction activities are subject to CWA 
regulation through the General Construction Storm Water Per-
mit (GCSWP).175  A landowner whose development or building 
project disturbs one or more acres of soil, or whose project is less 
than one acre but is part of a larger common project, is required 
either to obtain an individual NPDES permit or to file a NOI 
with the State Water Board indicating the intent to be covered by 
the GCSWP.176  It specifies that the landowner is responsible for 
obtaining coverage under the permit by signing the NOI.177 
The GCSWP is similar to the federal CGP in that it relies on 
process-based BMPs to control storm water discharges.178  How-
ever, unlike the CGP, the GCSWP contains a receiving water 
limitation that discharges “do not cause or contribute to an ex-
ceedence of any applicable water quality standard [WQS].”179 
As with the federal CGP, the GCSWP requires a permittee to 
develop and implement an SWPPP, which has several substan-
tive purposes.  First, it identifies likely sources of sediment and 
other pollutants that will affect the water quality from the con-
struction storm water discharge.180  Second, it describes the 
BMPs that will be used to control, to reduce or to eliminate these 
sources.181  Lastly, the SWPPP identifies the monitoring program 
that will be used to determine whether the BMPs are working.182 
The GCSWP requires that the SWPPP be available at the 
construction site from the start of the construction activities 
through the termination of coverage under the permit.183  But the 
 
 171 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13370–13389 (2005). 
 172 See Order No. 99-08, supra note 48. 
 173 CAL. WATER CODE § 13399.25 (2005). 
 174 Id. at §§ 13399.25–13399.43. 
 175 See Order No. 99-08, supra note 48. 
 176 Id. 
 177 California EPA, State Water Resources Control Board, Storm Water Program: 
Construction Frequently Asked Questions, question number 3, available at http://www. 
swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/constfaq.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Construction 
FAQs]. 
 178 See Order No. 99-08, supra note 48. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 See Construction FAQs, supra note 177, at question number 12. 
 183 Order No. 99-08 provides: “The SWPPP shall remain on the [construction] site 
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current permit only requires the SWPPP to be available on-site 
at the construction location.184  This on-site requirement is un-
necessarily restrictive in that it hinders private citizens and en-
vironmental groups from gaining ready access for the purpose of 
inspecting and determining the SWPPP’s legal adequacy. 
To improve public access to SWPPPs, the Executive Director 
of the State Water Board recently requested Regional Water 
Boards to assist members of the public in gaining access to 
them.185  But a stronger nostrum is required than simply encour-
aging cooperation by Regional Water Boards.  The permit itself 
should reflect the obligation to meet a broader public dissemina-
tion policy.  With the electronic digitization of records, regulatory 
agencies should be required, at a minimum, to post NOIs as well 
as SWPPPs on officially maintained web sites to improve public 
access.  The EPA recently proposed this approach for the 2006 
industrial storm water permit applicable to areas of the United 
States not authorized to administer the NPDES permit pro-
gram.186 
Another concern is the uncertainty with respect to permit 
compliance.  This concern has caused frustration for dischargers, 
regulators, and environmental groups.187  The State Water Board 
has formed a Blue Ribbon panel to assess the potential for mak-
ing the storm water program more performance-based, and thus 
more certain.188  The panel is tasked with assessing whether it is 
technically feasible to establish numeric effluent limitations, or 
some other objective criteria, for inclusion in storm water permits 
generally, including the general construction storm water per-
mit.189 
 
while the site is under construction, commencing with the initial mobilization and ending 
with termination of coverage under the permit.”  Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 E-mail from Celeste Cantu, Executive Director, to Regional Water Board Execu-
tive Officers and Assistant Executive Officers (on file with author). 
 186 EPA, Office of Wastewater Management, View Stormwater NOIs, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/noisearch (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
 187 California EPA, State Water Resources Control Board Water Quality, Notice of 
Public Meeting: National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Storm Water 
Program, Meeting of Storm Water Panel of Experts available at http://www.waterboards. 
ca.gov/stormwtr/docs/panel_notice.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2006). 
 188 Id.; see also letter, “State Water Board Process for the Development of Quantita-
tive Measurements for Stormwater Program Compliance” (Aug. 15, 2005), from Karen 
Ashby, Chair, California Stormwater Quality Association to Bruce Fujimoto, Chief, Storm 
Water Program, State Water Board, http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/stormwtr/docs/ 
numericcom/casqa.pdf. 
 189 Id. 
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VII.  DUAL REGULATION OF CONSTRUCTION  
STORM WATER ACTIVITIES 
Construction storm water activities are directly regulated as 
industrial activities.190  They are also potentially subject to regu-
lation under the municipal discharge requirements of Section 
402(p).191  MS4 permittees,192 usually local governments, are re-
quired to “effectively prohibit non-stormwater discharges” into 
their storm sewer conveyance systems.193 
The MS4 requirements effectively create a dual system of 
regulation.194  A MS4 permittee is required to enforce its local 
land use ordinances and accompanying construction permits in a 
manner that satisfies the above input “into” the conveyance sys-
tem prohibition as well as the PS discharge requirements output 
“from” the system.195  Thus, a construction storm water discharge 
may be regulated both on the basis of its connection or discharge 
into the MS4 and also as an industrial activity. 
As a matter of regulatory theory, the MS4 and GCSWP pro-
grams are intended to complement and support each other in 
achieving the shared goal of minimizing pollutant discharges in 
runoff from construction sites.196  MS4 regulation is based on the 
principle that local government controls most construction activi-
ties through the issuance of development and other land use 
 
 190 Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (p)(3)(A) (2000). 
 191 Clean Water Act § 402(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2000). 
 192 The Clean Water Act does not define the term “municipal separate storm sewer.”  
However, it is defined in the storm water regulations at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8) (2004): 
  Municipal separate storm sewer means a conveyance or system of convey-
ances (including roads with drainage systems, municipal streets, catch basins, 
curbs, gutters, ditches, man-made channels, or storm drains): 
(i) Owned or operated by a State, city, town, borough, county, parish, dis-
trict, association, or other public body (created by or pursuant to State 
law) having jurisdiction over disposal of sewage, industrial wastes, storm 
water, or other wastes, including special districts under State law such as 
a sewer district, flood control district or drainage district, or similar en-
tity, or an Indian tribe or an authorized Indian tribal organization, or a 
designated and approved management agency under section 208 of the 
CWA that discharges to waters of the United States; 
(ii) Designed or used for collecting or conveying storm water; 
(iii) Which is not a combined sewer; and 
(iv) Which is not part of a Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) as 
defined at 40 CFR section 122.2. 
 193 Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B)(ii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(ii) (2000). 
 194 See generally 40 C.F.R. Parts 122, 123, and 124 (2004).  The EPA places enforce-
ment responsibility on local government to develop and implement regulatory mecha-
nisms to control sediment and erosion and to use sanctions to ensure compliance.  40 
C.F.R. § 122.34(b)(4)(ii)(A) (2004). 
 195 Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B) (2000). 
 196 See Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B)(ii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(ii) (2000). 
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permits.197  As the lead permitting authority for construction ac-
tivities, local government therefore has the principal responsibil-
ity for controlling the water quality consequences from storm wa-
ter discharges resulting from its planning, construction, and land 
use decisions.  One area that has received too little attention to 
date is the importance of coordinating standard MS4 and 
GCSWP permit requirements, such as monitoring and reporting, 
for purposes of regulatory consistency.198 
In California, the State Water Board and Regional Water 
Boards look first to local government to enforce compliance with 
its applicable ordinances and permits under the MS4 permit.199  
State regulators have several non-exclusive options when con-
fronted with a construction storm water violation.  They may 
bring an enforcement action directly against the builder-
developer of the construction activity for non-compliance with the 
terms of the GCSWP.200  They also may bring an enforcement ac-
tion against the local government for violating the MS4 permit 
requirements.201 
VIII.  THE “FUNCTIONAL” PERMIT THEORY: DIVERGENT VIEWS 
In Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. EPA,202 the EPA 
generally prevailed against various administrative, statutory, 
and constitutional challenges to the Phase II Storm Water Rule 
regulating small MS4s and small construction sites.203  However, 
the Ninth Circuit also held that the Rule was legally deficient in 
certain important respects.204  The Rule allows operators to ob-
tain coverage under the CGP simply by filing a NOI.205  Coverage 
was available without regulatory review by the EPA, and also 
without public participation on the issuance of the specific NOI 
and accompanying SWPPP.206  The court found that this process 
violated the express provisions of the CWA.207  As a result, the 
court vacated those parts of the Rule that were procedurally defi-
 
 197 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8) (2004). 
 198 The detailed analysis of this concern is beyond the scope of this article. 
 199 California EPA, San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board, Municipal 
Storm Water Permit—Frequently Asked Questions, question number 12, available at 
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/rwqcb9/programs/stormwater/faq.html (last visited Feb. 14, 
2006). 
 200 Order No. 99-08, supra note 48. 
 201 Id.; Clean Water Act § 309(e). 
 202 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Tex. Cities Coal. on Stormwater v. EPA, 
541 U.S. 1085 (2004). 
 203 Id. at 840. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 853. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc., 344 F.3d at 855–56. 
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cient and remanded the matter to the EPA.208 
In 2005, the Second Circuit decided Waterkeeper Alliance, 
Inc. v. EPA,209 which dealt with the EPA Rule applicable to Con-
centrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) and Nutrient 
Management Plans (NMPs).210  The court applied an “actual dis-
charge” of pollutants standard to navigable waters.211  But for 
our purposes, the Second Circuit’s decision is arguably significant 
because it cites with approval the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning on 
the failure to require permitting authority review of the NMP be-
fore issuing a permit.212  According to the court, NMPs for CA-
FOs, which function similarly to SWPPPs for construction sites, 
should have been included as part of the permit.213 
A split in the federal circuits occurred several months after 
the Waterkeeper Alliance decision.214  The Seventh Circuit de-
cided Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Associa-
tion v. EPA.215  Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit 
held that construction-project NOIs are not the “functional 
equivalent” of a permit, and SWPPPs are not subject to the pub-
lic participation requirements of the CWA.216 
The “functional equivalent” theory is critical to the applica-
tion of the “public hearing” and “public availability” requirements 
found in the CWA.217  Section 402(a)(1) sets forth the public hear-
ing requirement: “the Administrator may, after opportunity for 
public hearing, issue a permit.”218 
The precondition to the issuance of a permit is the opportu-
nity for a public hearing.219  For the 2003 CGP and its earlier ver-
sions, the opportunity for a public hearing was satisfied during 
the notice and opportunity to comment period.220  The question of 
statutory construction is whether a public hearing is also re-
quired upon filing of a NOI, which depends on whether the NOI 
 
 208 Id. at 840. 
 209 399 F.3d 486, 507 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding in part that the EPA’s failure to require 
substantive permitting agency review of Nutrient Management Plans (NMPs) for Concen-
trated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), which are point sources under 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(14) (2000), violated the CWA). 
 210 Id. at 486. 
 211 Id. at 505 (finding that in the absence of an “actual” addition of any pollutant to 
navigable waters from any point, there is no PS). 
 212 Id. at 500 n.18. 
 213 Id. at 500. 
 214 Tex. Indep. Producers and Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 978 (7th 
Cir. 2005). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. at 978 n.13. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Clean Water Act § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000). 
 219 Id. 
 220 See generally Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc., 344 F.3d at 852–53. 
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should be considered the “functional equivalent” of a “permit” or 
“permit application.”221 
The public availability issue also turns on finding a permit or 
permit application.  Section 402(j) states: “A copy of each permit 
application and each permit issued under this section shall be 
available to the public.  Such permit application or permit, or 
portion thereof, shall further be available on request for the pur-
pose of reproduction.”222  The problem here also depends on find-
ing the NOI a “permit” or “permit application.”223  If it is either, 
then presumably the SWPPP may be treated as a “portion 
thereof,” and therefore also subject to the “available to the public” 
requirement.224 
Regardless of whether NOIs or SWPPPs are treated as the 
functional equivalent of permits, they ought to be subject to the 
public availability provisions of CWA Section 308(b)225 and the 
requirement that records, including a description of the SWPPP, 
be available to the public at reasonable times during regular 
business hours.226  The posting of electronic copies of NOIs and 
SWPPPs on officially maintained web sites would aid public ac-
cess to these important documents without imposing a significant 
administrative burden.  Thus, the more significant legal ques-
tions are the application of the public hearing requirement and 
the public opportunity to meaningfully comment on the SWPPP. 
A. Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. EPA 
A closer examination of Environmental Defense Center, Inc. 
v. EPA227 is necessary.  The focus was on the legality of the Phase 
II Rule (Rule).228  Consequently, one might be tempted to argue 
that the “functional” permit theory should be limited to the op-
eration of the Phase II Rule.  One might argue that the func-
tional permit analysis outside the Rule is dicta or that the per-
mitting scheme under the Rule differs from the traditional 
permitting model.229 
 
 221 Id. at 857 (holding NOIs are the functional equivalent to permit applications); see 
Tex. Indep. Producers and Royalty Owners Ass’n, 410 F.3d at 978 (holding NOIs are not 
permit applications). 
 222 Clean Water Act § 402(j), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(j) (2000). 
 223 Tex. Indep. Producers and Royalty Owners Ass’n, 410 F.3d at 978. 
 224 Clean Water Act § 402(j), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(j) (2000). 
 225 Clean Water Act § 308(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (2000). 
 226 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(g)(2) (2004). 
 227 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Tex. Cities Coal. on Stormwater v. EPA, 
541 U.S. 1085 (2004) (denying cert. on the petition of whether the EPA’s Phase II Storm-
water Rule violated the Tenth Amendment by coercing local governmental entities either 
to enforce a federal program or to surrender their police powers). 
 228 Id. at 840. 
 229 Id. at 854. 
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This narrow view of the decision misses important additional 
considerations that arguably support its broader application.  
The Second Circuit’s decision in Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA,230 
which endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, suggests that the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Environmental Defense Center has 
broader persuasive appeal than being limited to small MS4s.231  
The Second Circuit captures this point in the following state-
ment: “The demand that permits authorizing municipal storm 
sewer discharges must ‘require controls’ is, in sum and sub-
stance, identical to the demand that permits authorizing dis-
charges from other point sources must ‘assure compliance with’ 
applicable effluent limitations.  Both provisions require regula-
tion of discharges in fact.”232  In essence, the narrow focus on the 
Phase II Rule is a distinction without a difference to the broader 
point of necessary regulatory oversight to protect water quality. 
The critical part of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Envi-
ronmental Defense Center is found in the following statement 
adopting a functional equivalent theory: “[T]he EPA’s failure to 
require review of the NOIs, which are the functional equivalents 
of permits under the Phase II General Permit option, and its 
failure to make NOIs available to the public or subject to public 
hearings contravene the express requirements of the Clean Wa-
ter Act.”233  The finding that the NOI was the functional equiva-
lent to a permit was critical because it provides the foundation 
for the conclusion that the Rule contravenes the CWA require-
ments that permits be “available to the public” and “subject to 
public hearings.”234 
Several considerations led the court to conclude that the NOI 
was the functional equivalent of a permit or permit applica-
tion.235  First is the substantive importance of the NOI pursuant 
to the Rule.236  The NOI, the court reasoned, contains the sub-
stantive information necessary to determining whether the 
statutory effluent limitation standard of “maximum extent prac-
ticable” (MEP) has been met.237  The CGP does not contain this 
information; only the NOI contains it.238  Under the Rule, an op-
erator satisfies the statutory requirement to reduce discharges to 
 
 230 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 231 See id. at 500 n.18. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc., 344 F.3d at 879 (emphasis added). 
 234 Id. at 857. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 853. 
 238 Id. at 853–57. 
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the MEP upon implementing its identified SWPPP.239  Thus, the 
court found that the Rule on the NOI “crosses the threshold from 
being an item of procedural correspondence to being a substan-
tive component of a regulatory regime.”240 
The Rule states that “[c]ompliance with the conditions of the 
general permit and the series of steps associated with identifica-
tion and implementation of the minimum control measures will 
satisfy the MEP standard.”241  This aspect of the Rule has an im-
portant substantive consequence.  By merely implementing the 
BMPs chosen by the operator, the operator is deemed to meet the 
MEP effluent limitation requirement.242  The court reasoned that 
all an operator needs to do is to decide for itself the steps needed 
to meet MEP and to implement them.243  Without a mandatory 
system of regulatory review of the NOI and accompanying 
SWPPP, nothing prevents an operator from either misunder-
standing or misrepresenting its own predetermined storm water 
compliance.244  In the end, the Rule provides no system of regula-
tory review to assure that the storm water measures chosen and 
implemented by the operator in fact reduce the discharges to the 
MEP.245 
Once the “functional permit” theory was found to apply, the 
Ninth Circuit pointed to the Rule’s failure to provide for adequate 
public participation.246  The public received neither notice nor the 
opportunity for a hearing on the NOI.247  The EPA argued that 
the NOI was neither a “permit” nor “permit application,” and 
therefore was not subject to the public hearing and public avail-
ability provisions of the CWA.248  A NOI is legally distinguishable 
from a permit application because a NOI is submitted after the 
general permit has been promulgated by the EPA.249  Assuming 
arguendo that the NOI should be considered a “permit” or “per-
mit application,” the EPA maintained that the public availability 
requirements were met through a combination of the public in-
volvement minimum measures,250 the Federal Freedom of Infor-
mation Act,251 and state freedom of information acts.252 
 
 239 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(a) (2004). 
 240 Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc., 344 F.3d at 853. 
 241 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,754 (Dec. 8, 1999). 
 242 Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc., 344 F.3d at 855 n.34. 
 243 Id. at 855. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. at 857. 
 247 Id. at 856. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. at 853, 857. 
 250 Id. at 857. 
 251 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1989). 
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The court rejected the EPA’s public participation argu-
ments.253  It reasoned that the “technical issues” applicable to 
permitting should be decided in “‘the most open, accessible forum 
possible, and at a stage where the [permitting authority] has the 
greatest flexibility to make appropriate modifications to the per-
mit.’”254  This openness was lacking, and as a result, the Rule vio-
lated the “clear intent of Congress.”255 
B.  Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners  
Association v. EPA 
The Seventh Circuit adopted a different view of the GCP in 
Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association v. 
EPA.256  The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed a 
petition to review the CGP.257  The court found that the NRDC 
did not have standing to present a substantive challenge to the 
merits of the CGP,258 but that it did have standing to present cer-
tain procedural challenges based on the failure to provide a pub-
lic hearing on the NOI and SWPPP and the failure to mandate 
their public availability.259  As might be expected, the procedural 
challenges were based on Sections 402(j) and 402(a)(1).260  The 
court rejected the NRDC’s procedural claims, which relied on a 
functional equivalent theory.261 
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning turns on the application of 
the Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council decision.262  In 
Chevron, the Supreme Court established a two-step judicial test 
for reviewing federal agency interpretations: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute 
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.  First, 
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
 
 252 Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc., 344 F.3d at 857. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. at 856–57 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,885 (June 7, 1979)). 
 255 Id. at 857. 
 256 410 F.3d 964, 967 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 257 On July 1, 2003, the EPA issued its Final NPDES General Permit for Storm Wa-
ter Discharges from Construction Activities (CGP).  68 Fed. Reg. 39,087 (July 1, 2003); see 
also Tex. Indep. Producers, 410 F.3d at 967. 
 258 Tex. Indep. Producers, 410 F.3d at 967. 
 259 Id. at 977. 
 260 Id., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(j), 1342(a)(1) (2000).  The NRDC also claimed that the CGP 
violated the CWA for failing to ensure that the discharge meets the water quality and 
technology requirements of the CWA, and that the CGP violated the Endangered Species 
Act.  Tex. Indep. Producers, 410 F.3d at 969–70. 
 261 Id. at 978 n.13. 
 262 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.  v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress.  If, however, the court determines Congress has not di-
rectly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.  
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.263 
The Seventh Circuit applied the step-two deference of Chev-
ron.264  The Seventh Circuit reasoned that Congress had not spo-
ken to the issue and, if it had, its directions were at best ambigu-
ous.265  This view that the Rule does not present a step-one 
analysis under Chevron is persuasive.  Congress did not define 
what constitutes a “permit” or “permit application,” nor did it 
provide any explanation of the manner in which NPDES permits 
and permit applications are to be made publicly available.266  
Thus, the challenge to properly applying Chevron was whether 
the determination that NOIs and SWPPPs were not “permits” or 
“permit applications” was a permissible statutory construction by 
the EPA. 
The court found that arguments advanced by the EPA were a 
permissible construction of the CWA under Chevron.267  The EPA 
argued that a fundamental distinction exists between a “general 
permit,” which is proposed through the notice and comment proc-
ess, and a “permit application,” which is considered by the public 
at a hearing during the application process.268  This distinction 
supports the view that no additional need exists either for public 
comment or notice with respect to general permits.269 
The EPA also maintained that requiring the opportunity for 
an additional public hearing for each NOI and SWPPP was not 
sound as a matter of policy.270  It “would eviscerate the adminis-
trative efficiency inherent in the general permitting concept.”271  
Such a requirement would place too heavy a burden on the ad-
ministration of the system of general permitting, and thus con-
flict with Congress’ intent to allow the use of general permits.272  
 
 263 Id. at 842–43 (emphasis added). 
 264 Tex. Indep. Producers, 410 F.3d at 978. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Tex. Indep. Producers, 410 F.3d at 978. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
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As recognized in NRDC v. Costle,273 the CWA allows the use of 
general permits: “Area-wide regulation is one well-established 
means of coping with administrative exigency.”274 
The Seventh Circuit was aware of the Ninth Circuit’s “func-
tional equivalent” theory  and specifically rejected it: 
The Ninth Circuit’s majority . . . found under step one of Chevron that 
Congress clearly intended NOIs to be subject to the public availability 
and public hearing requirements because NOIs are the functional 
equivalent of a permit application. . . . [T]he statutory language [CWA 
Sections 402(j) and 402(a)(1)] at issue addresses only “permit applica-
tions” and fails to include any mention of NOIs, SWPPPs, or other so-
called “functional equivalents.”275 
In addition to rejecting it, the Seventh Circuit recognized 
that its opinion creates a split between the federal circuits.276 
C.   The Constructional Principle “In Pari Materia” 
Certain principles of statutory construction undermine the 
raison d’etre for the functional permit theory.  Section 402(p) au-
thorizes the use of “system or jurisdiction-wide” permits for mu-
nicipal discharges.277  While this section does not expressly au-
thorize them for industrial storm water discharges, Section 
402(p)(6) does direct the EPA to establish a “comprehensive pro-
gram” to regulate storm water discharges that may include “per-
formance standards, guidelines, guidance, and management 
practices and treatment requirements . . . .”278  The EPA’s gen-
eral permit program of construction storm water regulation ar-
guably fits within this congressional direction.  Similarly, given 
the administrative and technical complexity of storm water regu-
lation, Section 402(p)(6) also provides the justification for apply-
ing step two of Chevron.279 
The industrial storm water provisions of Section 402(p) in-
corporate the requirements of Section 301, which contains two 
regulatory strategies: WQSs and technology-based standards, 
which in the case of storm water regulation is MEP achieved 
through BMPs.280  The Ninth Circuit did not consider the role 
played by WQSs as a regulatory oversight tool to ensure that wa-
 
 273 Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 274 Id. at 1381. 
 275 Tex. Indep. Producers, 410 F.3d at 978–79 n.13 (internal citations omitted). 
 276 Id. 
 277 Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B)(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(i) (2000). 
 278 Clean Water Act § 402(p)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(6) (2000). 
 279 Clean Water Act § 402(p)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(6) (2000); see supra note 263 and 
accompanying text. 
 280 Clean Water Act §§ 301(b), 402(p)(3)(B)(iii), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) 
(2000). 
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ter quality is in fact protected.281  Section 301(b)(1)(C) states: 
not later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent limitation, including 
those necessary to meet water quality standards, treatment stan-
dards, or schedule of compliance, established pursuant to any State 
law or regulations, (under authority preserved by Section 510 [of this 
title]) or any other Federal law or regulation, or required to imple-
ment any applicable water quality standard established pursuant to 
this Act.282 
A NPDES permit cannot legally authorize a discharge in vio-
lation of WQSs regardless of the perceived substantive role 
played by the SWPPP under the Rule.283  In short, the CWA re-
quires that limitations necessary to meet WQSs be imple-
mented.284  Equally important, the CGP also recognizes this obli-
gation.285 
The storm water provisions added by Congress in 1987 re-
quire the EPA to issue storm water regulations to “protect water 
quality.”286  In doing so, Congress created a moratorium on storm 
water discharges occurring prior to October 1, 1994.287  But the 
moratorium does not apply to a discharge that “contributes to a 
violation of a water quality standard or is a significant contribu-
tor of pollutants to waters of the United States.”288 
The overview to the Rule itself recognizes the obligation to 
protect WQSs.  It states:  “[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, EPA 
presumes that a small MS4 program that implements the six 
minimum measures in today’s rule does not require more strin-
gent limitations to meet water quality standards [WQSs].”289 
The language creates a presumption that additional limita-
tions are not required.  But it is a rebuttable presumption be-
cause the presumption applies “[a]bsent evidence to the con-
trary.”290  Consequently, evidence may be submitted by 
regulators or other interested parties to demonstrate that the 
“minimum measures” do not in fact meet WQSs.291  Thus, if after 
 
 281 This failure by the Ninth Circuit is curious in light of Defenders of Wildlife v. 
Browner, 191 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that only industrial dischargers 
were “expressly” required by § 1342(p)(3)(A) to comply with WQS). 
 282 Clean Water Act § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (2000); see also Clean 
Water Act § 303(e)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3)(A) (2000). 
 283 Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). 
 284 Clean Water Act § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (2000). 
 285 See NPDES General Permit supra note 15. 
 286 Clean Water Act § 402(p)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(6) (2000). 
 287 Clean Water Act § 402(p)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(1) (2000). 
 288 Clean Water Act § 402(p)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(E) (2000). 
 289 EPA, Regulations for the Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program, 64 
Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,753 (Dec. 8, 1999). 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
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implementing the minimum control measures identified by the 
Rule, evidence exists that the discharger is nonetheless causing 
or contributing to non-attainment of WQSs, the builder may be 
required to take additional substantive steps by expanding or 
better tailoring its BMPs.292  In short, the substantive effect of the 
Rule is not as complete as the Ninth Circuit reasons in Environ-
mental Defense Center, Inc. v. EPA.293 
In addition, the court failed to consider the existence or pos-
sible application of the federal antidegradation policy.  The con-
structional principle in pari materia (part of the same material) 
counsels that legislation should be interpreted by the courts so 
that the respective parts of the law being construed are inter-
nally consistent.294  In the context of storm water regulation, its 
application is based on the normative view that Congress was 
cognizant of the antidegradation or anti-backsliding provisions of 
the CWA295 when it added Section 402(p) in 1987. 
As part of the WQS program, a state is required to have an 
antidegradation policy that also limits the perceived determina-
tive effect of the Rule.296  The federal antidegradation policy pro-
vides: 
(a) The State shall develop and adopt a statewide antidegradation pol-
icy and identify the methods for implementing such policy pursuant to 
this subpart.  The antidegradation policy and implementation meth-
ods shall, at a minimum, be consistent with the following: 
(1) Existing instream water uses and the level of water quality 
necessary to protect the existing uses shall be maintained and 
protected. 
(2) Where the quality of the waters exceed levels necessary to 
support propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation 
in and on the water, that quality shall be maintained and pro-
tected . . . . Further, the State shall assure that there shall be 
achieved the highest statutory and regulatory requirements for 
all new and existing point sources and all cost-effective and rea-
sonable best management practices for nonpoint source control. 
(3) Where high quality waters constitute an outstanding National 
resource, such as waters of National and State parks and wildlife 
refuges and waters of exceptional recreational or ecological sig-
nificance, that water quality shall be maintained and pro-
tected.297 
 
 292 Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b) (2004). 
 293 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 294 See e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711(1996). 
 295 Clean Water Act § 402(o)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(1) (2000). 
 296 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2004). 
 297 Id. 
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The implementation of this policy must ensure that existing 
beneficial uses and “high quality waters” are protected.298  Thus, 
the antidegradation policy provides an additional regulatory in-
strument to assure regulatory oversight. 
In California, the antidegradation policy is formally known 
as the Statement of Policy with Respect to Maintaining High 
Quality of Waters in California.299  It restricts discharges that 
degrade surface and ground waters.300  Under the policy, any ac-
tions that can adversely affect water quality in any surface and 
ground waters must “be consistent with the maximum benefit to 
the people of the State, will not unreasonably affect present and 
anticipated beneficial use of such water and will not result in wa-
ter quality less than that prescribed in [water quality basin 
plans].”301  This policy is consistent with federal requirements.302 
The congressional grant of authority to the EPA to create a 
general permit system reasonably includes the authority to im-
plement it without the imposition of a NOI public hearing obliga-
tion.303  This point was made by the dissent in Environmental De-
fense Center: 
The majority’s position fails to give deference to [the] EPA and im-
poses the majority’s own wishes instead.  EPA would have been justi-
fied in creating a system entirely reliant on general or area permits.  
Its imposition of NOIs is an indulgence to certain policy prerogatives, 
namely public involvement and the collection of additional informa-
tion.  But the power to create a general permit system necessarily im-
plies the power to require subordinate steps for NOIs that do not quite 
reach the level of inquiry associated with actual permits.304 
Finally, public policy should be considered.  To the extent 
that the filing of a NOI or SWPPP triggers the need for a public 
hearing, this requirement eviscerates the administrative effi-
ciency inherent in the general permitting concept that has been 
authorized by Congress.  Providing a public hearing for each NOI 
or SWPPP would undoubtedly compromise important aspects of 
administrative efficiency. 
 
 298 Id. 
 299 California State Water Resources Control Board, Resolution No. 68-16: Statement 
of Policy with Respect to Maintaining High Quality of Waters in California, available at 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/plnspols/wqplans/res68-16.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). 
 300 Id. 
 301 Id. 
 302 See id. 
 303 See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc., v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 882 (9th Cir. 2003) (Tallman, J., 
dissenting). 
 304 Id. 
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D.    Administrative Compliance with the “Functional”  
Permit Theory 
No evidence exists that Environmental Defense Center, Inc. 
v. EPA305 has an appreciable effect on the actual administration 
of construction storm water permitting in California.  This situa-
tion is somewhat reminiscent of Andrew Jackson’s comment on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia,306 which 
held Georgia’s anti-Cherokee statutes unconstitutional.307  He 
remarked: “‘John Marshall has made his decision, now let him 
enforce it.’”308 
In response to the Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. 
EPA,309 the EPA “recommends” the following: 
[P]ermitting authorities include permit language explaining the proc-
ess for requesting a public hearing on an NOI, the standard by which 
such requests will be judged, the procedures for conducting public 
hearing requests that are granted, and the procedures for permitting 
authority consideration of the information submitted at the hearing in 
determining whether to grant authorization to discharge to the sub-
mitter of the NOI.  If a public hearing is requested, the permitting au-
thority should consider both whether to grant a hearing and the range 
of options for the conduct of the hearing, including, for example, a sin-
gle public hearing for consideration of multiple Phase II MS4 permit-
tee NOIs.310 
The EPA does not recommend any specific administrative ac-
tion.  Little disagreement exists with the recommendation that 
the process for requesting the public hearing should be ex-
plained.311  But the critical issue is specifying the process to ac-
commodate the requirement.  Unfortunately, the EPA’s recom-
mendation is at such a level of generality that it falls short in 
being useful to those who have to implement the process. 
Another aspect of the EPA’s response is worth noting.  The 
recommendation that “the permitting authority should con-
sider . . . whether to grant a hearing”312 seems at odds with the 
application of the functional permit theory.  The EPA appears to 
 
 305 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 306 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 307 Id. at 595. 
 308 LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 745 (1974) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 309 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 310 Hanlon, Memorandum, supra note 32. 
 311 See N.C. Div. of Water Quality, NPDES Program FAQs, http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/ 
NPDES/faqs.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) (explaining procedures for requesting a pub-
lic hearing); Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Environmental Permit Brochure, 
http://www.deq.utah.gov/references/docs_rules/Permit.htm#wq (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) 
(explaining the same). 
 312 Hanlon, Memorandum, supra note 32. 
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be signaling its continuing support for the Rule, except in the 
Ninth Circuit where it has been judicially invalidated.313  In 
short, this guidance to regulators may also be an invitation to the 
Supreme Court to resolve the issue. 
Several administrative strategies may be suggested to re-
spond to the application of the functional permit theory.  The 
public hearing requirement might be satisfied by placing the NOI 
and SWPPP on the “uncontested items calendar” agenda of the 
permit-issuing agency.314  This timesaving approach to adminis-
tratively managing noncontroversial agenda items would satisfy 
the hearing requirement.  The public hearing requirement might 
be easily accommodated because items on the consent calendar, 
more formally known as the uncontested items calendar, may be 
considered and voted on by one motion.315 
A concern with using the “consent calendar” as the adminis-
trative mechanism to satisfy the public hearing requirement is 
the ease with which any item can be removed from it.  The 
agenda notice for action items coming before the San Diego Re-
gional Water Board, for example, states: 
CONSENT CALENDAR: The agenda contains items listed on a con-
sent calendar which is for matters considered routine or otherwise not 
requiring further deliberation.  A committee or the Board will take ac-
tion as recommended by one motion. There will be no individual dis-
cussion on such items prior to the vote unless an item is removed for 
discussion.  If a member of the public wishes to talk about a consent 
calendar item, please notify the Chair before the calendar is called. 
Persons who wish to be heard on an item are encouraged to speak be-
fore the assigned committee.316 
Because any person can request a hearing, the possibility ex-
ists that NOIs may be routinely removed from the consent calen-
dar by opponents of a particular project.317  Easy removal would 
slow the permitting process since a hearing would be required.  It 
would give advocates of slow-growth or no-growth a convenient, 
as well as powerful, mechanism to challenge construction pro-
jects. 
Another concern is the management of the consent calendar.  
Although placing the matter for expedited consideration may 
avoid a lengthy formal or informal hearing, if the NOI is re-
moved, items must be complete before the permit issuing agency 
 
 313 See id. 
 314 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 647.2(f) (2005). 
 315 See id. 
 316 San Diego County Water Authority, Notice to the Public, available at http://www. 
sdcwa.org/board/notice.phtml (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). 
 317 See id. 
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takes action at the public hearing.318  This requires the adminis-
trative staff to review and to recommend action on every SWPPP 
for expedited consideration.  Using the consent calendar may as-
sist in meeting the hearing requirement, but it is no panacea. 
A second approach might be to rely on the citizen-suit notice 
provisions as the mechanism to trigger the public hearing re-
quest.319  Like most federal environmental statutes, the CWA 
grants citizens the right to file suit in federal court when there is 
an alleged failure to perform any act or duty under the CWA that 
is not discretionary.320  Before filing suit, the CWA requires 
plaintiffs to provide 60 days’ notice to the alleged violator, which 
in this case would be the permitting agency.321  The notice re-
quirement exists to allow the agency to take corrective action 
without the necessity of litigation. 
This citizen-suit notice might be used by regulators as the 
basis for providing the mechanism to request the public hearing 
in particular cases.  Upon receiving notice, the permitting agency 
could consider the request and grant the hearing as appropriate.  
But this strategy suffers the same shortcoming as using the con-
sent calendar.  The 60 days’ notice could easily turn into a pro 
forma request by objectors to any and all construction projects. 
A more fundamental concern exists.  Using the citizen-suit 
notice provisions to request the public hearing might be seen as 
the systematic creation of a cumbersome procedural barrier, and 
one that is inconsistent with the core principle of the functional 
equivalent theory.  In California, the Porter-Cologne law provides 
that the Regional Water Board shall prescribe waste discharge 
requirements “after any necessary hearing.”322  A hearing is nec-
essary according to the application of the functional equivalent 
theory.323  Thus, a hearing should be routinely available without 
the necessity of threatening litigation. 
In the end, providing a hearing on every storm water NOI 
and SWPPP has the potential to bring the construction storm 
water permit issuing process to a grinding halt.  Perhaps a more 
sensible solution exists by focusing on the substantive nature of 
 
 318 See generally id. 
 319 The availability of citizen suit enforcement actions was rejected as a substitute for 
the EPA’s enforcement responsibility.  See e.g., Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 
855 n.32 (9th Cir. 2003).  The argument being made here is that the citizen suit provision 
might be used as the basis for administering the request for a public hearing. 
 320 Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000). 
 321 Clean Water Act § 505(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
 322 CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 13263(a) (West 2005). 
 323 See Clean Water Act § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000) (providing that  “the 
Administrator [of the EPA] may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit”); see 
also discussion infra Part VIII. The “Functional” Permit Theory: Divergent Views. 
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the SWPPP.  To the extent that the SWPPP is not treated as 
substantively determinative, the claim that the functional 
equivalent theory should apply is arguably unavailing. 
MS4 storm water permits do not treat the Storm Water 
Management Plan (SWMP), which is functionally similar to the 
SWPPP, as satisfying the statutory requirement of MEP.324  This 
policy approach could be incorporated into the construction storm 
water permitting program.  In essence, the minimum measures 
that are treated as compliance with MEP by the Phase II Rule 
need to be viewed more flexibly, and less determinatively. 
This approach goes to the raison d’etre for applying the func-
tional permit theory.  The absence of regulatory oversight was 
the trigger for the opportunity for a public hearing.325  In other 
words, providing the opportunity for a hearing through the func-
tional permit theory is the legal mechanism to assure oversight.  
The determination of whether a builder has reduced pollutants to 
the MEP by using various BMPs can only be made by the permit-
issuing agency, not by the developer.  Otherwise, the system is 
self-regulatory. 
MEP ought to be viewed as a dynamic standard by regula-
tors and developers alike.  The standard should be treated as re-
quiring developers to use whatever combination of pollution pre-
vention, source control, and BMPs that are technologically and 
economically effective.  To the extent that regulatory monitoring 
or on-site inspection reveals that additional or modified BMPs 
are needed to protect water quality, the ability of regulators to 
require corrective action by developers exists.  In addition to hav-
ing the authority to require corrective action, regulators have the 
authority under the CWA to take other enforcement action.326 
 
 
 324 But see 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) (2000) (“Permits for discharges from munici-
pal storm sewers . . . (iii) shall require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the 
maximum extent practicable . . . .”); California EPA, State Water Resources Control 
Board, Storm Water Program: Phase II Small MS4 General Permit Questions and Answer 
Document, http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/smallms4faq.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006) (“[P]ermits for [MS4] must require municipalities to reduce pollutants in their 
storm water discharges to the MEP. . . .  MS4 permits ‘shall require controls to reduce the 
discharges of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable, including management prac-
tices, control techniques and systems, design and engineering methods.’”); California 
EPA, State Water Resources Control Board, Stormwater Program: Municipal Program, 
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/municipal.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006) (“The MS4 
permits require the discharger to develop and implement a Storm Water Management 
Plan/Program with the goal of reducing the discharge of pollutants to the maximum ex-
tent practicable (MEP).  MEP is the performance standard specified in Section 402(p) of 
the Clean Water Act.”). 
 325 See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 852 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 326 See Clean Water Act § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000). 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
A compelling case exists that construction activities are a po-
tential source of water quality impairment.  Sediment runoff 
from construction sites, which exceeds natural erosion rates 
when land is cleared or altered during development, is one of the 
largest pollutant concerns.327  But sediment runoff is not the only 
concern.  Regulators are also concerned with a wide array of ad-
ditional pollutants, such as nutrients used to fertilize landscap-
ing, the application of toxic pesticides, and the generation of 
trash and other construction debris.328  Some best management 
practices (BMPs) carry special concerns.  Standing water in fil-
tration basins, for example, may encourage vector production 
that may threaten public health.329  The actual palette of pollut-
ants depends on climatic conditions as well as the particulars at 
the construction site.  The type of pollutant subject to off-site re-
lease also varies as the project progresses through its various 
phases toward completion, and thus is dynamic. 
The Clean Water Act (CWA), which is based on Congress’ au-
thority under the Commerce Clause, sets out the requirements 
that must be satisfied by dischargers to comply with federal law.  
The jurisdictional prerequisites to regulation and enforcement 
are the discharge of a pollutant to waters of the United States 
from a point source (PS).330  Thus, the CWA does not apply with-
out these requirements (discharge, pollutant, navigable waters, 
and PS) being met. 
The CWA regulates the pollutants in storm water discharges 
from construction activities under the permitting system estab-
lished by National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) program.331  Discharges of any pollutant into navigable 
waters from a point source are unlawful unless the discharge 
complies with an NPDES permit.332  The failure to secure a re-
quired permit as well as the noncompliance with the terms of an 
NPDES permit are both unlawful, and subject the violator to civil 
and criminal sanctions.333 
 
 327 EPA, Storm Water Phase II Final Rule Fact Sheet Series, Small Construction Pro-
gram Overview (Jan. 2000), available at http://www.undeerc.org/watman/stormwater/ 
factsheets/fact3-0.pdf. 
 328 EPA, U.S. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Fact Sheet, supra note 68, at 3–4. 
 329 See Swarna Muthukrishnan, Richard Field & Daniel Sullivan, The Use of Best 
Management Practices (BMPs) in Urban Watersheds (Sept. 2004), at 2–38, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ORD/NRMRL/pubs/600r04184/600r04184chap2.pdf (last visited Feb. 
19, 2006). 
 330 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 311(b), 33 U.S.C.S. § 1321(b) (LexisNexis 2002). 
 331 See Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000). 
 332 Id. 
 333 See Clean Water Act § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000). 
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In 1987, the CWA was amended adding the industrial storm 
water provisions of Section 402(p).334  Construction activities, 
which fall within the industrial category, that disturb one acre or 
more of land and meet the requirements of the CWA are now 
regulated.335  Given the large number of construction sites subject 
to CWA regulation, most developers elect to be regulated by a 
“general permit” designed to regulate an entire group or category 
of activities.  Although individually issued NPDES permits may 
be issued to developers, individual NPDES storm water permits 
are not the norm.  Thus, the effective and efficient administra-
tion of the “general permit” storm water system is critically im-
portant to regulators, the building industry, and the community.  
It is also significant because construction storm water regulation 
has been elevated as an enforcement priority by regulators.336 
A developer requests coverage under the general storm wa-
ter permit by filing a Notice of Intent (NOI).337  At this time, the 
implementation of best management practices (BMPs) is consid-
ered by regulators to be the most appropriate method of meeting 
the maximum extent practicable (MEP) standard.338  A Storm 
Water Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP), which accompanies 
the NOI, identifies the proposed BMPs to reduce pollutants.339  It 
also identifies the potential sources of pollution that are expected 
from the construction site, and contains the assurance that the 
developer will comply with the terms and conditions of the con-
struction storm water permit.340    
The states play an important role in administering the storm 
water law.  Most states are authorized by the EPA to administer 
the NPDES program, subject to continuing oversight by the 
EPA.341  As a result, the states tend to be at the forefront of ad-
ministering the storm water program, including enforcement.342  
 
 334 Clean Water Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (Feb. 4, 1987). 
 335 Extension of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit 
Deadline for Storm Water Discharges for Oil and Gas Activity That Disturbs One to Five 
Acres, 70 Fed. Reg. 11,560 (Mar. 9, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/ 
regulations/sw_oil_gas_final_rule.pdf. 
 336 EPA, Compliance and Enforcement National Priority: Clean Water Act, Wet 
Weather, Storm Water (Nov. 2004), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/ 
data/planning/priorities/fy2005prioritycwastorm.pdf. 
 337 EPA, EPA’s Electronic Stormwater Notice of Intent (eNOI) Home Page, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/enoi.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). 
 338 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.34 (2004). 
 339 See EPA, Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plans for Construction Activities, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/swppp.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). 
 340 See id. 
 341 Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000); see also discussion supra 
Part IV. The Construction Industry and Clean Water Act (CWA) Storm Water Regulation. 
 342 See EPA, Authorization Status for EPA’s Stormwater Construction and Industrial 
Programs, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/authorizationstatus.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2006) (providing a table listing which states have been authorized to implement 
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States also play an important role when acting to protect water 
quality based on state law considerations independent of the 
CWA.  In such cases, a state may provide more protection than 
provided by the CWA even though the formal mechanism to pro-
viding this additional protection may be incorporated in the fed-
eral NPDES permit.343 
In California, for example, any person discharging or propos-
ing to discharge waste that could affect the water quality of the 
waters of the state is subject to regulation.344  This grant of regu-
latory authority—”could affect the water quality”—is broader 
than the “discharge to navigable waters” Commerce Clause re-
quirement of the CWA.345  A legal reservoir of independent state 
constitutional authority exists to provide greater water quality 
protection than that available under federal law. 
The CWA requires the opportunity for a public hearing on a 
“permit” or “permit application.”346  But actually providing a pub-
lic hearing for each construction activity seems at odds with the 
nature of a general permit system.  The federal circuits are di-
vided as to whether this hearing requirement applies to a NOI 
and accompanying SWPPP.347  The failure of Congress to define 
“permit” or “permit application” is the starting point to under-
standing the controversy that led to the functional permit the-
ory.348  Ultimately, the functional equivalent permit theory must 
be addressed by Congress or the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
This article has examined the divergent views on this theory.  
In Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. EPA,349 the Ninth Cir-
cuit considered the NOI and accompanying SWPPP the func-
tional equivalent to a “permit” or “permit application.”350  The 
 
the NPDES storm water program). 
 343 See City of Burbank v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 108 P.3d 862, 870 (2005) (re-
jecting the argument that state exercising the discretionary authority recognized by the 
CWA acts pursuant to federal law based on the theory that the CWA incorporates state 
water policy into federal law). 
 344 CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 13260(1) (West 2005). 
 345 See CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 13260(a)(1) (West 2005); see also Clean Water Act § 
401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2000). 
 346 Clean Water Act § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000) (providing that “the 
Administrator [of the EPA] may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a per-
mit . . . .”). 
 347 See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Tex. 
Cities Coal. on Stormwater v. EPA, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004), accord Waterkeeper Alliance, 
Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005), but see Tex. Indep. Producers and Royalty Own-
ers Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964 (7th Cir. 2005) reh’g denied en banc Aug. 26, 2005. 
 348 See discussion supra Part VIII. The “Functional” Permit Theory: Divergent Views. 
 349 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Tex. Cities Coal. on Stormwater v. EPA, 
541 U.S. 1085 (2004). 
 350 Id. at 858. 
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Phase II Rule did not provide for regulatory oversight, which led 
the court to conclude that the Rule constituted an impermissible 
self-regulatory regime.351  In other words, the functional permit 
theory became the legal mechanism to assure regulatory over-
sight by providing the opportunity for a public hearing.  The 
court applied the Supreme Court the first step of the two-part 
test set forth in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
and found that this lack of oversight contravened the express re-
quirements of the CWA.352 
In 2005, the Seventh Circuit decided Texas Independent Pro-
ducers and Royalty Owners Association v. EPA.353  It rejected the 
functional permit theory as it applies to storm water regula-
tion.354  Because Congress had not defined the critical terms 
“permit” or “permit application,” the court reasoned that the 
critical issue was the application of step two of Chevron: whether 
the EPA’s construction of the CWA requirements was “permissi-
ble.”355 
Several considerations led the court to conclude that the 
EPA’s position was permissible and should be sustained.  First, 
the opportunity for a public hearing was granted when the per-
mit was promulgated by the EPA for notice and comment in the 
Federal Register.356  The public had the opportunity at this time 
to weigh in on the proposed permit when it was promulgated.357  
Furthermore, Congress did not specify that a NOI or SWPPP 
should be considered a “permit” or “permit application.”358  
Rather, it assigned the EPA the task of developing a comprehen-
sive storm water program.359  Second, granting a public hearing 
on each NOI and accompanying SWPPP was simply unworkable 
as an administrative matter given the large number of construc-
tion activities subject to possible regulation.360  Finally, granting 
a public hearing on each NOI and SWPPP would undermine the 
general permitting scheme approved by Congress.361  Thus, the 
functional permit theory appears not to further Congress’ intent 
but to be inconsistent with it. 
When pared to the core, the functional permit theory is 
 
 351 Id. at 852. 
 352 Id. 
 353 410 F.3d 964 (7th Cir. 2005), reh’g denied en banc Aug. 26, 2005. 
 354 Id. at 978. 
 355 Id. 
 356 Id. 
 357 See id. 
 358 Id. 
 359 Tex. Indep. Producers and Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 968 (7th 
Cir. 2005), reh’g denied en banc Aug. 26, 2005. 
 360 See id. at 978. 
 361 Id. 
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based on the perceived substantive importance of the SWPPP.  I 
have argued that its substantive importance is minimized, and 
thus the raison d’etre for its existence, when additional factors 
involving regulatory oversight and enforcement are taken into 
account.  The role of Water Quality Standards (WQSs) and the 
federal antidegradation policy were not considered in considering 
the appropriateness of the theory.  When they are taken into ac-
count, the Rule proposed by the EPA is significantly less “self-
regulatory” than envisioned by the Ninth Circuit.362  I have also 
argued that the Seventh Circuit’s analysis is more persuasive 
based on the application of Chevron.  The Rule is a “permissible” 
construction by the EPA furthering the intent of Congress to 
promote the use of general permits.363 
The division between the federal circuit courts on the role of 
the functional equivalent theory leaves developers, regulators, 
and the community with no clear answer to the question: What 
does the CWA require?  Pending resolution of the answer either 
by Congress or the Supreme Court, I have suggested several so-
lutions for coping with the requirement to provide the opportu-
nity for a public hearing in those federal circuits applying the 
theory. 
Perhaps the most promising approach is for regulators to 
treat the minimum BMP measures more flexibly, and less deter-
minatively in meeting the statutory requirement of “maximum 
extent practicable” (MEP).364  In doing so, this would require de-
velopers to recognize that implementing the BMP measures iden-
tified in the applicable construction SWPPP is no assurance that 
regulators will treat the developer in compliance with the CWA.  
This approach inevitably results in some uncertainty with re-
spect to compliance.  Thus, the regulatory challenge that lies 
ahead to reduce uncertainty is a scientific one: the formulation of 









 362 See id. 
 363 Id. 
 364 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.34 (2004). 
